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AN APPROACH TO LONG-RANGE FORECASTING OF
CONTROLLED HUMAN INTELLIGENCE TASKS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements of the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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1974

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

A B S T R A C T

An Approach to Long-Range Forecasting of Controlled
Human Intelligence Tasks

Major Richard B. Fisher

21 June 1974

204 pages

This thesis describes an attempt to prove the hypothesis that a threat/opportunity matrix methodology can be used to effectively define targets against which an effort to satisfy long-range informational requirements may be attempted by the use of controlled human intelligence techniques.

Nothing as well defined as a target was found, but a more generalized concept was, and shows promise of further rationalizing the management of intelligence collection. In addition, the threat/opportunity matrix was exhaustively exercised, using the Nixon foreign policy in future Russian and Indian environments, and may prove a useful tool of policy analysis after further development.

P R E F A C E

Over the past 14 years, the writer of this thesis has engaged in many conversations regarding the relative merits of methods of intelligence collection. Unfortunately for the advancement of military knowledge, these conversations were usually more entertaining than fruitful. During an assignment in 1968-1970 to the Directorate of Operations, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army, however, the conversations became much more pointed, for the mission was the allocation of resources among various means of collecting intelligence. It was during this assignment, and with the aid of many gifted and dedicated colleagues, that the general model of intelligence collection management reflected in this thesis began to take shape. While the materials used in the demonstration of the model are largely assumed, the logic is the heart of the thesis and the intended contribution to the advancement of military art and science.

This thesis is not a recommendation that the particular intelligence methods and tasks described be adopted by any agency of the United States Government, because current holdings, programs, and policies are not considered. The purpose, rather, is to examine a general approach to identifying intelligence collection tasks, under any given set of objectives and constraints.

No classified Defense information was consulted or included in writing this thesis. Materials used were those available at the United States Army Command and General Staff College.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

We have been discovering the limits of our resources as a nation--economic, social, military, and political. The testing has been intensive and has included some of the notable upheavals and crises of our times. The rejection and examination of early decisions made in regard to Vietnam, our inability to unilaterally and decisively ameliorate inflation and the energy crisis, the challenges of and shifts in formerly accepted social patterns, the push to withdraw troops from overseas, are all examples of attempts to adapt to new conditions. At the same time as the nation-state seems to be losing its monopoly as the context for relations between peoples, the United States continues to be engaged in a contest of strength with a rival nation-state, the Soviet Union, and must increasingly deal with others, notably the People's Republic of China, who are gaining the means to be important global actors.

It is reasonable to assume that such profound changes in the arena for national action must be reflected in changed requirements for intelligence upon which to base national decisionmaking. This is reflected in the observation of Colonel Donald F. Bletz that, in a multipolar world, intentions will enjoy the priority of intelligence interest which

capabilities once enjoyed.¹ As interests are redefined and roles shifted, new kinds of intelligence will be needed in the difficult period of adjustment--typified in the "verification" problems of SALT (Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty) and MBFR (Mutual, Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

In addition to changes in the environment, there appear to be internal or institutional changes which may reflect a willingness or desire to restate fundamental premises on which the Defense intelligence community has operated for a number of years. The sudden creation, practically by Executive fiat, of the Defense Mapping Agency, the Central Security Service, and the Defense Investigative Service in late 1971² supports this conclusion. In addition, the pressures to tighten the Defense budget in recent years and the foreseeable future encourage intense examination of roles and missions, needs and means, and competing claims to greater operational efficiency.

Finally, there have been changes in the very nature of intelligence activity which make the moment propitious for new proposals on how to manage the collection of intelligence. Historically, the basic intelligence problem has been that of collection. It no longer is. With the onset of the space and electronic technological revolutions, we can--and may tend to--collect far more information than our leaders can make intelligent use of. At the same time, the ancient art of espionage may be suffering, due to a failure to examine and redefine its place in

¹ Donald F. Bletz, "How Much Force to Defend Against What?" Military Review, January, 1974, pp. 3-12. Bletz was Director, U.S. National Studies, Department of National and International Security Studies, United States Army War College, at the time of writing.

² White House Announcement of 5 November 1971.

relation to an altered world, new intelligence requirements, and a radically changed technology of intelligence collection. To address these matters, the exercise described below was designed.

PROBLEM AREA

Intelligence collection operations may be divided into those which are "technical"--that is, relying basically upon some device such as a camera or radio receiver--and those which are not. While exact figures are not available, it is no secret that the capabilities of and reliance upon the former have greatly increased in the past 25 years. The data these systems present, while not necessarily literal, is "self-evident"--that is, a camera does not lie, although it can be deceived. The data is produced in great volume and at very high speed. Further, these systems probably appeal in some way to an American instinct to let a machine do it. In addition, there seems to be a climate of opinion which holds that not only are humans as collectors considered to be so inefficient as not to be cost-effective, but that the idea of using actual spies is so rife with visions of embarrassment and chicanery as to be beyond the pale, literally a contingency or "last resort" operation. This appears to be an extraordinarily simplistic approach to intelligence collection management.

The problem was set, therefore, of seeing whether or not our latest national policy objectives could be compared with what is being said of the world between now and 2000, the results being expressed as questions to be answered (informational objectives). These questions would then be analyzed in light of the characteristics of one collection method, controlled human intelligence (Humint), to see if collection

tasks for the long-range period could be identified. A general assumption is made that intentions will be of increasing relative importance as a collection objective.

HYPOTHESIS

That a threat/opportunity matrix methodology³ can be used to effectively define targets against which an effort to satisfy long-range informational requirements may be attempted by the use of controlled human intelligence techniques.

DEFINITIONS

Humint. An acronym for human intelligence, the intelligence collection method or system which is oriented on the human being as the data sensing device.

Long range period. Ten to twenty years.

Mid-range period. Two to ten years.

Photint. An acronym for photointelligence, the intelligence collection method or system which is oriented on the camera, radar, and other image-capturing equipment as the data sensing devices.

Sigint. An acronym for signals intelligence, the intelligence collection method or system which is oriented on the radio receiver as the data sensing device.

Target. The object of collection activity. The person, place or activity which can be exploited to gain the information sought.

³See Figure 1.




Figure 1.

Threat/Opportunity Matrix Method for Identifying

Target area. Area in which targets related to a given subject are expected to be found, generally a country.

Target element. Subelement of a target.

Target type. A target described in general terms of its susceptibility to attack by a particular collection method.

T_O (pron, "T"-sub-"O"). Time required to establish a specified reporting capability.

T/O area. Short form of "threat/opportunity area," the concept of an area within which a policy objective and a forecast theme interact to produce threats to, or opportunities for the attainment of the objective.

T_R (Pron, "T"-sub-"R"). Time required to reduce a target (gain the information sought), on a one-time basis.

T_T (pron, "T"-sub-"T"). The time by which the information, which is the objective of a specified collection operation, must be obtained and reported.

BASIC ASSUMPTIONS

The first basic assumption is that President Nixon's U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace (hereinafter USFP IV) is a complete and authentic statement of American foreign policy objectives; and that the selection of forecasts of and observations on the future which was used is a representative and valid one.

The second basic assumption is that Colonel Hletz is correct when he says in the January 1974 issue of Military Review that, "the 'threat' in the evolving international environment will be the unpredictability

of the system and will cause a shift in emphasis from capabilities to intentions in the area of intelligence estimation."⁴

The third is that the discussion which follows is an accurate characterization of the major intelligence collection systems in general, and of the controlled Humint method in particular: Aside from their common characteristics, e.g., susceptibility to direction, the major systems (photointelligence, signals intelligence, human intelligence) differ in some profound ways. Photint produces masses of data very quickly, but an earth surface signature must be present for it to register, and it can be deceived. Sigint produces data in even greater quantity and at high speed--in fact this outpouring of data may be its major drawback. It also suffers from the fact that it is just so much hardware unless the correct target is identified, has something to say, and says it. The human sensor used in Humint is slow, fragile, and forgetful, but uniquely sensitive to certain kinds of stimuli. Humint operations are of two kinds: exploitative--gathering grist for the intelligence researcher's mill from open sources; and controlled--conducting secret operations to gain access to closely guarded personalities. It is emphasized that there is no reasonable way to compare costs between the various methods, because of the variance in the targets they would be tasked with attacking if all of these assumptions are valid, and the management of the systems is rational. Detailed development of these characteristics is found at Appendix A.

⁴Eletz, p. 12.

RELATED LITERATURE

The search for literature related to the problem of the method of identifying long-range tasks for controlled Humint was not fruitful. Two of the best known books in the field, Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper and Row, 1963) and Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., The Real CIA (New York: MacMillan, 1972) had nothing at all to contribute. By and large, the available materials were written before intelligence collection began to undergo a technological revolution, and were written by ex-researchers, rather than ex-collectors. The only discussions found which bore on the subject were in terms of the relationship of policy guidance to collection in general, and on the utility of controlled Humint. Roger Hilsman discussed a scheme very similar to that tested to forecast tasks, but related to intelligence research rather than to intelligence collection; and he dismissed it as extravagant and basically useless. There was agreement among the others that there should be a close relationship with the policymaker, and that the effort should be made to forecast intelligence requirements rather far into the future. There was a wide variety of opinion on the subject of intentions as a collection objective. Most considered them of theoretical value, but many doubted the utility of a great effort extended to collect them. Detailed discussion of the related literature is at Appendix B.

SYNOPSIS OF THE BALANCE OF THE THESIS

Chapter II, Methodology, describes how the model pictured in Figure 1 was tested to see if long-range collection tasks for controlled Humint, in the form of definitive targets, could be identified,

Chapter III, Policy Objectives, describes the first component of the model. General objectives of the Nixon foreign policy are described; objectives in regard to the two target areas, the Soviet Union and India, are summarized; and the reader is referred to the detailed discussion in Appendix C.

Chapter IV, Forecast Themes, concerns the second component of the model, and contains a discussion of general themes found in the forecast literature, a summary of forecasts concerning the Soviet Union and India, and some observations concerning the congruence between the policy objectives and the forecast themes. Reference is also made to the detailed analysis of the target area forecasts in Appendix D.

Chapter V, Test of the Model, carries the process through from the meshing of the first two components--policy objectives and forecast themes--in a threat/opportunity matrix, through the development of informational objectives and Essential Elements of Information (EEI), to the attempt to identify targets. Two examples of the 69 cases (intersections in the two threat/opportunity matrixes) are examined: One concerns the Soviet Union and is carried all the way through the model. The other concerns India and goes no further than the threat/opportunity matrix, because no informational objective could be identified. Details of the other 67 cases are found in Appendixes E and F.

Chapter VI, Analysis and Conclusions, examines the effectiveness and significance of the model as demonstrated in the test.

CHAPTER II

METHODOLOGY

INTRODUCTION

The Test

In this Chapter will be found a description of the method by which a long-range forecast of controlled Humint tasks was attempted. See Figure 1. The criteria for success of the forecasts, to be applied in Chapter VI, Analysis and Conclusions, will also be described.

The same sequence of steps was followed for each of two target areas:

1. United States policy objectives in regard to the country were analyzed and summarized.
2. Forecasts concerning the country were reviewed and analyzed for themes, especially those which appeared to be related to United States policy objectives.
3. The policy objectives and the forecast themes were compared for general congruence, in a narrative discussion.
4. Each policy objective was then compared to each forecast theme or trend. Displayed in a matrix format, the intersection of objective with trend was referred to as a "threat/opportunity area", and was examined to see if the threat/opportunity was critical to attainment of the

objective, and if the clash of the two had any force implications. If both of these criteria were met, an informational objective (what decisionmakers need to know when faced with this threat to their objective) was established, and a corresponding EEI (see below) written.

5. The EEI which resulted from this analysis of T/O areas were themselves analyzed to see if a target for controlled Humint collection could be found. The problem was first looked at from the standpoint of feasibility of applying the controlled Humint method (cost-benefit analysis), and then from the standpoint of the relative effectiveness of Photint, Sigint, exploitative Humint and controlled Humint, and a conclusion reached as to the recommended method (cost-effectiveness analysis).

Criteria

One absolute criterion for the success of the test of the hypothesis was established: Were targets identified? In addition, relative success would be measured in terms of the specificity of the identity of the target and of the date by which it can and must be reduced.

Choosing the Target Area for the Test

The forecasting methodology could, of course, have been tested against a purely hypothetical target area. Certainly fewer preconceptions would be engaged if, for example, an alien, extraterrestrial society were designed, assumed to be potentially threatening, and examined for suitable intelligence collection targets. Assuming the design were sufficiently complete, we might learn something about the potential use of the

methodology on earth, problems of cross-cultural communication aside. It was concluded, however, that such a procedure would suffer by comparison with even the sketchiest, earthbound scenario in both utility and interest. This approach disposed of, therefore, it appeared that it would be instructive to test the forecasting method against more than one target area. It seemed further that choosing target areas in which there was wide variance in current concern might prove interesting, if indications were found that there seemed to be some correlation between ease of target identification and the amount of current interest in (and literature on) the target area.

The Target Areas Chosen

The Soviet Union was chosen, if only to avoid being asked why it was not chosen. In terms of capability, there is no question that she presents the most powerful threat to this nation into the early years of the long range, if not well beyond. The Soviet Union is an extremely complex intelligence problem, and is second only to the United States in the affections of the popular forecasters who will be used to place United States policy objectives in perspective.

India was also chosen. Its potential is of much more concern than its present power. The statement of United States foreign policy objectives and the forecasts which will be used reflect more than a little uncertainty about the long-range role this country will play on the world stage. Even more interestingly, there is some evidence that current policy is shaped to some degree by moralistic categorizations carried over from an earlier era--in contrast to the realism which, in the opinion of the writer, is generally characteristic of this Administration's

announced policy objectives. In short, this country was chosen for many reasons which are the reverse of those which supported the choice of the Soviet Union as a target area.

**THE SCENARIO: UNITED STATES POLICY OBJECTIVES
AND FORECASTS OF THE ENVIRONMENT**

Derivation of Policy Objectives

U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace:
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the United States, dated 3 May 1973, hereinafter USFP IV, was accepted as a current and comprehensive, albeit general statement of United States foreign policy objectives. It includes projections as lengthy as are realistic to expect in a document carrying such an imprimatur. Obviously it may be lacking in candor. This, too, would be unsurprising in a document of this character, especially coming from an Administration known for highly centralized decision-making in the foreign policy field. While its reliability may be open to question in the future, there are no grounds to question it in the present--and its authenticity cannot be challenged. In building the scenario, the statements of objectives regarding each of the target areas were extracted, and summarized or extrapolated.

Environmental Forecasts

Selected popular general forecasts and some articles of narrower geographical or topical focus were consulted to sketch in an environment in which the United States, it is assumed, will seek to attain the objectives stated or implied in USFP IV for the two target areas.

Emphasis was on painting potential threats (or aids). Attempts made to measure the waxing and waning of threats over time were in vain, however. Appropriate note was taken of problems which arose in trying to construct of these two components--policy objectives and forecasts--a test environment, e.g. a forecasted major threat which doesn't appear to be addressed in USFP IV, even allowing for its ostensible short-to mid-range time frame ("the 1970's").

INFORMATIONAL OBJECTIVES

Terminology

It was stated above that informational requirements or objectives would be sought which would be critical to the pursuit of the stated policy within the projected environment. U.S. Army combat intelligence doctrine includes the concept of "Essential Elements of Information" or "EEI", which are defined as:

those critical items of information regarding the enemy and his environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist him in reaching a logical decision. The decision is of a type which involves the mission of the command and the choice of a course of action which can be taken to accomplish the mission. Any enemy capability or characteristic of the area which is a governing factor in the choice of a course of action will be an EEI. Enemy capabilities or area characteristics which may affect but which will not prevent the accomplishment of the mission, regardless of which course of action is chosen, will qualify as other intelligence requirements.¹

The writer has found the concept very useful in the field of combat intelligence and believes that, with appropriate modification and

¹Department of the Army, FM 30-5, Combat Intelligence (February, 1971), p. 4-2.

simplification it is suitable to this national intelligence problem, provides depth to the idea of "critical to the pursuit of the stated policy", and gives us a short term for a key step in the model under test.

Scope

This must be further qualified by stating that the informational objectives and EEI which we will try to identify are those which have to do with the application or parrying of force (a concept falling somewhere between persuasion and violence, but sometimes including the latter, e.g. aggressive economic policies) in pursuit of the national policy. This makes the arena somewhat narrower than "national security", which seems to have a sizeable domestic component, and somewhat larger than "military", which connotes the more-or-less conventional activities of or directed by persons in uniform.

TARGETS

Translation of Informational Objectives into EEI and Targets

Borrowing again from U.S. Army doctrine, the informational objective, when found, was translated into an EEI and expressed as a question, which could be translated further into an intelligence collection target. For example, to support contingency planning involving South Africa, it may appear critical that we know whether we will be able to ship Southeast Asian oil to the east coast of the U. S. via the Panama Canal. Translating this informational objective into an EEI, it becomes a question along the lines of, "If (the conditions of

the contingency scenario apply), will the Panamanian Government or other effective agency close or attempt to close the Canal to U. S.-bound shipping?" The question having been asked, the source of the answer--the collection target--must be identified.

The Target

The final step in the analysis of the model was the attempt to identify targets. For the purposes of this experiment, a target is defined in terms of milieu (sector, class, profession or trade, generation, echelon, etc.) in the target area. Further, an attempt was made to state how much time might be needed for the reduction of the target, and what some of the tradeoffs might be if target time (T_t) were less than the desired operational development time (T_o) or forecast target reduction time (T_f).

Target Elements

In some cases, the informational objective or EEI may be translatable directly into a target element, especially if the objective is related to some personal matter not apt to be known by persons other than the subject and, at most, his most intimate associates. Generally, however, it was concluded that the attempt to identify target elements for every informational objective would be largely ineffective, due to the data required, and not worthwhile, due to the ephemerality or mortality expected of target elements in a time frame of the length of the one used in this paper.

EVALUATION OF THE TEST OF THE MODEL

Acceptance

It goes without saying that a forecast cannot be tested for the accuracy of its content until the time frame of the forecast event is past---assuming one has the tools to measure accuracy, which is not always the case. A forecast can, however, be tested for acceptance. "Acceptance" is defined here as the extent to which alternative courses of action can be eliminated with an acceptable degree of confidence that one is putting one's effort where it is the most apt to be effective. Perhaps the highest degree of acceptance which can reasonably be sought is that which defines the Hudson Institute's "surprise-free projection"---a statement (projection) which says, in effect, "Having found myself in agreement with the reasoning by which you reached your conclusion, I would not be surprised if such-and-such came to pass."

Utility

The utility of the target forecasts was defined for this paper as the extent to which, beyond the mere elimination of alternatives, the forecast might be put into operational terms. The factors involved are the specificity of the target description, and whether or not the time required for reduction of the target (T_r) or required to develop a reporting capability (T_o) exceeds the time available to time-information-no-longer-of-value (T_t). Operational development time (T_o) was based on the following estimated factors: development of personnel (0-10 years); planning, programing, coordinating the operation (6 months - 3 years);

developing the operation (from issuance of the task to the operational element to establishment of the reporting capability or reduction of the target--answering the question completely, thus changing T_o to T_r .) (6 months - 6 years). These times are guesses on the writer's part, based on the analysis of the characteristics of the technique--from its political sensitivity to the difficulty of identifying, much less communicating with a traitor in the enemy's camp.

Tradeoffs

If, for a given forecast target, the operational development time exceeded the time to time-information-required ($T_o > T_t$), some tradeoffs might be considered before dismissing the application of controlled Humint or the target altogether. The operational development time could be shortened, for example, by accepting a lesser state of training in operational personnel, or by trying to accomplish the mission by straining the access of intermediate personnel to the target (e.g. accepting the higher security risk of attempting to make contact by using someone with a more remote natural relationship to a target element instead of waiting to forge another, closer link before attempting contact). On the other hand, the time restriction could be eased by agreeing to accept the information later (T_t) than had originally been required. The opportunity for tradeoffs will be discussed, as appropriate, in those cases in which $T_{or} > T_t$.

CHAPTER III

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter introduces the first component of the threat/opportunity matrix model, the policy objectives. See Figure 2. It opens with an overview of general themes found in USFP IV. This is followed by summaries of the policy objectives regarding the Soviet Union and India. Detailed descriptions of the latter are found in Appendix C.

GENERAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

The Recognition of a New World

In his introduction to USFP IV, President Nixon states that he recognized that a new approach was needed after a generation spent in Cold War (p. 2)* in addition to which new problems had arisen--pollution, overpopulation, etc.--to which no purely national solutions are possible. (p. 4) A "more stable international system" is called for, although the citizen is warned that the "hard realities of ideological opposition, geopolitical rivalry, competing alliances, or military competition" are not to be removed by mere expressions of good will. (p. 6) In his conclusion he states that "we are seeking the philosophical, as well as the

*Throughout this chapter references to USFP IV will be shown as parenthetical page numbers in the body of the text, due to the frequency of references to a single work.




Figure 2

practical, reorientation of our foreign policy. This is the primary challenge of a radically different world." (p. 232)

Challenge. President Nixon acknowledges at the outset that the United States and the Soviet Union are now (1973) in rough strategic balance, and that this implies re-examination of past policies, for the threat, formerly unidirectional, is now "more varied and less blatant." (p. 4) This threat is the more dangerous because of the volatility of potential technological acceleration. (pp. 182, 183) The Soviet Union had invested heavily in her armed forces; our defense expenditures had risen astronomically. (p. 178) Putting the best light on it, "the international environment ... suggested new opportunities for diplomacy and, accordingly for adjustments in military planning" (p. 178), which one is tempted to interpret as: Cut your losses before you fall further behind. The general concepts chosen in 1969 to deal with this shift of power are described as follows:

"It is/ no longer realistic to allow Soviet-American relations to be predetermined by ideology ... Irrespective of ideology, any relationship between two great powers would be highly competitive. Both sides had to recognize, however, that ... there would be no permanent victor /in a continuance of Cold War/, and ... that to focus one's own policy on attempts to gain advantage ... could only aggravate tensions and precipitate counteractions." (p. 27)

Response. Retreat is ruled out; America's continuing, major involvement in the world is unavoidable. (p. 5) Our approach would be to deter all-out attack, to make less-than-all-out attack too risky to be attractive, and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion would be minimized. (p. 182) This would be achieved through a combination of strength and negotiation. "If superiority was not sic/ longer practical, inferiority would be unthinkable;" (p. 8) however, "through the gathering momentum of individual

accords we would seek to create vested interests on both sides in restraint and the strengthening of peace." (p. 7) But this "would require a reduction in tactical maneuvering at each other's expense in favor of our shared interest in avoiding calamitous collision, in profiting from cooperation, and in building a more stable world." (p. 7) However, "we would judge Soviet action rather than words," (p. 28) and the "United States cannot protect its national interests, or support those of its allies, or meet its responsibilities for helping safeguard international peace, without the ability to deploy forces abroad." (p. 186) Withal, an announcement of disengagement coupled with a warning to potential hostile powers not to try to exploit the disengagement.

National Priorities

Having acknowledged a new world situation and assessed its security implications, addressal of national priorities was called for.

"As President, my overriding responsibility is to protect the security of the United States," (p. 195) but the "allocation of resources between security needs and domestic requirements is one of the most difficult tasks of the budgetary process ... In the next four years from May 1973, we will continue to be faced with important choices concerning national priorities. But I am determined that our military power will remain second to none ... It is the only sound foundation on which peace can be built." (p. 193)

These are reduced to questions expressed in more operational terms:

"How could we simultaneously satisfy pressing domestic needs, meet our responsibilities in Vietnam, and maintain the capabilities of our other forces in a period when non-nuclear challenges were an important dimension of the security problem? How could we, in coordination with our allies, strengthen our mutual defense in a manner that retained their confidence in our reliability but permitted them to play a more prominent role?" (p. 179)

The answers lay in "sufficiency" of the nuclear deterrent, modernization of arms, arms limitation, and a reassessment of security obligations. (pp. 179,180)

National Goals

National goals are generally implicit rather than explicit in USFP IV. "National survival," in a physical sense, seems pretty clearly to be the subject of President Nixon's statement that "my overriding responsibility is to protect the security of the United States." (p. 195) What of the other security goal, the preservation of what Donald F. Bletz refers to as "values and interests,"¹ Richard A. Bowen as "principles and values,"² and Robert Leider as "the way-of-life interest"?³ Curiously, references in USFP IV to a goal in this latter category are so few and those so vestigial that one suspects they may be due more to the momentum of cliche than to any substantive import. The exception may be a persistent emphasis on the economic need for detente and cooperation. A hope expressed for the initial thrust toward detente with the Soviet Union was that "we could go on to establish longer term arrangements for ... economic cooperation on a scale appropriate to the size of our two economies," (p. 32) i.e. massive. And in "Future Issues" is found the statement that "our goals will be to ... continue to broaden economic

¹ Donald F. Bletz, "How Much Force to Defend Against What?" Military Review, January, 1974, p. 7.

² Richard A. Bowen, "Multinational Corporations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1973, p. 64.

³ Robert Leider, "An Old Strategist Speaks to the Young," Military Review, February, 1974, p. 3.

exchanges with the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and the nations of Eastern Europe." (p. 174)

Strategic Goals

The strategic goals derived from the assessment of priorities and the establishment of national goals are three in number: First, to establish a network of mutual interests with our most dangerous potential enemies. "As political relations improved, it became possible to initiate discussions on a wide range of projects for bilateral cooperation ... cumulatively, as cooperation in such fields widened and deepened they would reinforce the trend toward more constructive political relations."

(p. 31) Second, to break the momentum of the arms race. "Arms control has taken on a new significance in the nuclear age and represents an important component of national security policy." (p. 194) The President cites "my commitment to limit the most dangerous forms of weaponry as part of our broader objective of moving from confrontation to negotiation."

(P. 194) Thus, "our objective would be to break the momentum and moderate the process of strategic competition," (p. 195) to include constraining the rate of technological development. (p. 203) Finally, and perhaps more encompassing, "we seek a stable structure, not a classical balance of power," (p. 232) but detente is not the same as lasting peace. And peace does not guarantee tranquility or mean the end of contention.

The world will hold perils for as far ahead as we can see," (p. 233) not excluding the transnational problems which emerge as the only link between strategic goals and the Third World unrelated to the strategic equation.

SUMMARY OF POLICY OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION

The policy objectives were seen as falling into two broad categories: establishing a new relationship with the Soviet Union; and ensuring our physical survival in the face of the military might she possesses.

The first category was seen as consisting of two specific objectives: deideologizing the political relationship; and establishing a new, broader economic relationship.

Five specific objectives make up the second category: national survival; reduced defense costs; reassurance of our allies; maintaining the opening toward Eastern Europe; and restraining the growth of Soviet influence.

SUMMARY OF POLICY OBJECTIVES WITH REGARD TO INDIA

The policy objectives with regard to India were predominantly of a political character. These included preventing the dominance of South Asia and the Indian Ocean by a single regional power, the exclusion of dominant influence in the region by outside great powers, and permitting only those alliances which are strictly defensive. In addition to these political objectives, the aim of maintaining an idealistic component in our policy toward India was seen, as well as the desire for furthering our economic relationship.

CHAPTER IV

FORECAST THEMES AND TRENDS

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter consists of three major sections: First, there is an overview of general, non-localized forecast themes and trends, followed by some observations on its congruence with the general thrust of the Nixon Administration's foreign policy, as described in USFP IV. Next, there is a brief summary of the forecasts regarding the Soviet Union and, again, commentary on how they (in their detailed treatment in Appendix D) appear in relationship to American policy toward the Soviet Union. Finally, India is discussed in the same format of forecast summary, followed by discussion of congruence with United States policy. Detailed discussion of the forecasts concerning the Soviet Union and India is found in Appendix D. Forecast themes and trends constitute the second major component of the Threat/Opportunity Matrix Model (see Figure 3).

GENERAL FORECAST

What follows is the briefest possible overview of some recurring themes found in the review of some popular writings by and about "futurologists." Selection was narrowed to some extent by a tendency to attend to those matters which seemed related to "threat" (in the broad




Figure 3

sense, as used by Leider, to include threats to way of life)¹ or to intelligence operational environments. However, no effort was made to impose a consistency in outlook which does not exist. The discussion is organized into four sections: social and political; technological; economic; and a look at one of the most famous "thumbnail," universal forecasts, Kahn's "Multifold Trend." The purpose of this section is to sketch in some general factors which would apply equally to a discussion of U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Indian relationships, or of any one of the three countries individually.

Social and Political

The social and political (including military) environments are seen to be dominated by a general democratizing or egalitarian trend, on the scale of the individual and of the state alike, and to be further characterized by the frustrations of entering on post-industrial status, a sense of La Belle Epoque, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and small wars along with the exclusion of large wars.

Brzezinski states that, in the West at any rate, liberty having been obtained, equality is now sought;² and observes further that, "a profound discrepancy between the external conduct of a democracy and its internal norms is no longer possible."³ Hanson W. Baldwin, observing this

¹ Robert Leider, "An Old Strategist Speaks to the Young," Military Review, February, 1974, p. 11.

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), pp. 111ff.

³ Brzezinski, 255.

trend in America, considers it a mixed blessing for the strategist.⁴

Where others see a democracy in America, Andrew Hacker sees 200 million egos,⁵ and observes that most people do not have enough talent for individuality.⁶ Kahn and Bruce-Briggs, on the other hand, include in their "Multifold Trend" for the 1970's and 1980's, a "centralization and concentration of economic and political power."⁷

A growing egalitarianism between nations--"multipolarity", when major powers are involved--was also noted. Donald F. Bletz accepts the trend toward, if not a "pentagonal international structure," then at least a tendency toward multipolarity.⁸ Baldwin, on the other hand, sees self-determination gone wild.⁹ Louis J. Halle sees as a consequence of the growing egalitarianism a tendency to rule out gunboat diplomacy /the dilemma of having unusable power/, and says that the drive toward (individualistic) egalitarianism noted by Alexis de Tocqueville has become a drive toward "collective egalitarianism."¹⁰ Kahn and Bruce-Briggs concur in the expectation of an increasingly multi-polar world.¹¹

⁴ Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 77.

⁵ Andrew Hacker, The End of the American Era (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 9.

⁶ Hacker, 158.

⁷ Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties (New York: MacMillan, 1972), p. 8.

⁸ Donald F. Bletz, "How Much Force to Defend Against What?" Military Review, January, 1974, p. 5.

⁹ Baldwin, 291.

¹⁰ Louis J. Halle, "What Future for War? Are We Entering a Warless World?" Current, December, 1973, p. 52.

¹¹ Kahn, 45-46.

The proliferation of weapons technology which they foresee¹² is, of course, an expression of international egalitarianism. While a decline in nationalism was seen as the overall trend, Don Martindale has looked at this in a somewhat more analytical way:

"Contemporary men live in the sunset period of the national community. Nationalism is fading in Western Europe, the area of its origin, but in the world as a whole, mankind was never more fully organized and divided into national groups. The great confrontations ... involve nations and blocs of nations. In these confrontations contemporary men become self-conscious as nationals with similarities to and differences from other nationals ... The more fully they understand their national social characters the more possible it is for contemporary men also to overcome their unique parochialism and to devote their human and physical resources to the formation of a world community to benefit all mankind."¹³

The principal source on the frustrations accompanying entry into a post-industrial ("Technetronic," as he calls it) age was Brzezinski.

Although the Hudson Institute notes¹⁴ a questioning of accepted meanings of "progress," Brzezinski is concerned that some countries will be entering the postindustrial stage, while others have not yet achieved industrialization¹⁵; that America, the fount of the hallmarks of the technetronic

¹²Kahn, 186, 197.

¹³Don Martindale, "Preface," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 370, National Character in the Perspective of the Social Sciences, March, 1967, p. x.

¹⁴Hudson Institute, Alternative 1975-85 Political and Strategic Environments for Military Planners: A Contextual Overview with Thematic Charts (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, 1969), p. 22.

¹⁵Brzezinski, 35 ff.

age¹⁶ has not yet completely comprehended her second (industrial) revolution.¹⁷ Concerned by a reaction to a perceived failure of rationalism in action¹⁸, he concludes that, "... the technetronic age--by making so much more technologically feasible and electronically accessible--make[s] deliberate choice about more issues more imperative. Reason, belief, and values will interact intensely, putting a greater premium than ever before on the explicit definition of social purposes."¹⁹

Kahn and Bruce-Briggs perceive an American and Western "Deuxieme Belle Epoque," extending perhaps into the 1980's. Some of the more interesting features of La Belle Epoque, as they define it, include relative peace, rapid economic growth, growth of one-world concepts among upper classes, eroding faith in ideologies, arms competition and minor wars, increasing hedonism, and a sense of fin de siecle.²⁰ Baldwin, in a chapter entitled, "Colossus under Strain," sees the American urge for ease as a precursor to decline.²¹ Hacker is thoroughly pessimistic, as indicated by his title, The End of the American Era. He sees the seeds of decline in the blossom of self-confidence²² and says that the better life and higher expectations which followed World War II have produced a middle class which is too huge for its values.²³ As regards the world beyond their borders, he says that Americans have no sense of mission abroad, that they cannot take other countries seriously, and that they are

¹⁶ Brzezinski, 24.

¹⁷ Brzezinski, 220.

¹⁸ Brzezinski, 94.

¹⁹ Brzezinski, 309.

²⁰ Kahn, 32-33.

²¹ Baldwin, 76.

²² Hacker, 3.

²³ Hacker, 10, 29-32.

unwilling to sacrifice at home to support objectives abroad.²⁴ In ending, Hacker says that the American experience has never provided a vocabulary for decline²⁵, a deficiency he seems determined to remedy.

Finally, to turn briefly to the military environment--and in addition to or partially because of the proliferation of weapons technology noted above--small wars rather than large are foreseen. Halle, in examining the prospects for warfare, proposes that, for the first time in history, war seems to be beginning to lose its efficacy. As a consequence of nuclear armaments he considers great power warfare unlikely. He says that wars cannot be fought between small states without involving other powers, but that civil wars present the greatest danger. He concludes that the day of general war is past, barring the sudden internal collapse of a major power, resulting in gross disequilibrium. Nevertheless, he says, maintenance of armed forces will continue, as well as their sporadic, often clandestine use--"widespread and continual disorder ... I foresee barbarism." Eventually, however, the habit of violence between organized societies may go the way of the habit of personal combat.²⁶ Brzezinski takes a similar view. He envisions a routinization of conflict, and says that, much like crime in the city, war in the Third World seems both tolerable and characteristic in the minds of developed countries. He sees sporadic outbreaks, and attempts to use minimum, instead of maximum power.²⁷ The Hudson Institute, too, sees a growing toleration of conflicts and death, and a growing importance of the lex talionis.²⁸

²⁴Hacker, 219, 222, 223.

²⁵Hacker, 230.

²⁶Halle.

²⁷Brzezinski, 6, 7.

²⁸Hudson, p. 31.

Technological

Technological forecasts seem to be the most popular of all forecasts. Whether this is because of the relative ease of producing a universally appreciated "gee-whiz" forecast, or due to the linearity of technological forecasting is unknown. For the purposes of this study, however, the interest of the technological forecast lies in its ultimate meaning in terms of relations between states. Of particular interest are the forecasts found concerning the "1985 technological crisis," the new role of the seas, advances in reconnaissance and surveillance technology, and the forward movement of computation technology.

Included in their "Multifold Trend," Kahn and Bruce-Briggs see an accumulation of scientific and technical knowledge.²⁹ They also see a resultant "Faustian dilemma" in a "1985 Technological Crisis," which is characterized by many different technologies breaking down or developing out of our control almost simultaneously. They also foresee that, due to exponential development, we simply will not know about problems until they are already critical.³⁰ Victor Basiuk sees the "Impact of Technology in the Next Decades" as characterized by a freedom from the location of natural resources, integrative tendencies in juxtaposition to conflict potential, an acceleration of both technology and generational expectations, the continued merging of military with non-military technology, and the imperative need for control--reflecting substantial agreement with Kahn and Bruce-Briggs as to the details of the technological landscape.³¹

²⁹Kahn, 8.

³⁰Kahn, 205-219.

³¹Victor Basiuk, "The Impact of Technology in the Next Decades," Orbis, Spring, 1970, pp. 17-42.

Paul J. Hoffmann, in a representative article on the subject, describes the sea as an arena of war.³² More than a medium or buffer between continents, the sea may be fought over for its own sake, as a source of food and other resources.

Clifton C. Carpenter notes that the rapid development of reconnaissance and surveillance technology in recent years has transformed international relations through exposing what is (military, resources, geography), as opposed to what is purported to be (diplomacy).³³

Among his "Prospects of Technological Progress" by the year 2000, Olaf Helmer lists the possibility that, "cooperation between man and machine may have progressed to the point of actual symbiosis, in the sense of enabling man to extend his intelligence by direct electro-mechanical interaction between his brain and a computing machine"³⁴-- surely with profound implications for the whole meaning of intelligence as both knowledge and activity.

Economic

The economic trend dominating the forecasts consulted was the further integration of the world economy which became a reality after World War II, a development not foreseen by, for example, the Bretton Woods conferences, according to Peter F. Drucker.³⁵ His "Global Shopping

³² Paul J. Hoffmann, "New World for Which to War," Military Review, November, 1971, pp. 67-76.

³³ Clifton C. Carpenter, "Modern Technology and Political Geography," Military Review, January, 1973, pp. 69-76.

³⁴ Olaf Helmer, "Prospects of Technological Progress," The Futurists (ed. Alvin Toffler; New York: Random House, 1972), p. 153.

³⁵ Peter F. Drucker, "The Global Shopping Center," The Age of Discontinuity (ed. Peter F. Drucker; New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 87.

"Center" is characterized by a conviction that man need no longer tolerate poverty, and by a commonality of expectations, responses, and behavior.³⁶ He cautions, however, that so far the "world economy" is one of perceptions more than of institutions.³⁷ There is, however, one institution commonly considered to be characteristic of the evolving world economy; the multi-national corporation. Noting that they are, for the most part, both large and free-world based, Richard A. Bowen foresees a number of influences--some contradictory--which they may exert on international relations: Because they are unencumbered by ideology, he sees them as stabilizing, and promoting the interdependency of nations. He sees them as promoting peace, because of their need for international cooperation and a tranquil environment. On the other hand, tension can be increased due to heightened interaction. He can see them as both a divisive and a unifying influence on the free world; as both a blessing and a threat to the less developed countries.³⁸ The Economist Intelligence Unit foresees continued growth for the MNC's and cites their advantages in production, research and development, marketing, flexibility, finance, and in their ability to exploit the international product cycle.³⁹

The impact of resources supply and location is, on the one hand, so pervasive and, on the other, has been so widely and intensively examined in recent months that, suffice it for this paper to acknowledge it as a factor of great if not paramount importance. The inability of

³⁶ Drucker, 79, 80.

³⁷ Drucker, 83.

³⁸ Richard A. Bowen, "Multinational Corporations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1973, pp. 55, 57, 59.

³⁹ Economist Intelligence Unit, The Growth and Spread of Multinational Companies (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, Ltd., 1971), pp. 13-17.

scientists, engineers, and economists to delineate clear projections of problems and to approach any consensus on solutions is equally evident. The status of and projections for the international monetary structure is an equally important and arcane subject.

Bletz succinctly describes the changed and changing strategic environment and its impact on the economics of U.S. defense in stating that the days of holding up the "Communist" threat as justification for force requests are numbered. He states further that the resources available (not the "threat") will be the major force determinant; that a force based on countering the capabilities of all actors in a pentagonal or multipolar world would be so fantastically large as to be beyond consideration.⁴⁰ Baldwin's Strategy for Tomorrow is notable for the extent to which the economics of defense are considered. While asserting that arms races are the result, not the cause of world tensions⁴¹, he acknowledges the essentiality of economic strength to national strength.⁴² Considerations of cost are inherent in even his most Olympian analyses; thus, Eliminating at the outset rule by fiat as too costly,⁴³; he states that history compels us, as a rimland power, to adopt a sea-air strategy. We have been enamored of continental strategies (the World War II levee en masse), and ground army generals have played a large part in our strategy formulation, as they have in Russia. But our population is small, life is dear--and our technology is great. Therefore, we should lead

⁴⁰ Bletz, 8-10.

⁴¹ Baldwin, 333.

⁴² Baldwin, 78.

⁴³ Baldwin, 292.

from strength to the enemy's weakness.⁴⁴ Descending to the rough-and-tumble of fiscal battles, he advises that the Pentagon must ensure that the risks are clearly understood, and not expect to be satisfied; that although we can "afford" whatever we decide to pay, manpower is expensive, and a continental strategy requires manpower.⁴⁵ Finally, he notes that, although our procurement systems may be awful⁴⁶, millions can be saved in the defense budget, not billions.⁴⁷

The "Multifold Trend" and the "Final Third of Twentieth Century".

To bring to a close this quick and general review of forecasts found to be relevant and provocative, the Hudson Institute is called on for some "charts" found in their "Overview" of Alternative 1975-85 Political and Strategic Environments for Military Planners (as well as in Kahn's Things to Come and Toward the Year 2000). Although the "Multifold Trend" has gained some fame as a minor masterpiece of macrohistory, the two are companion pieces when the reader's interest is long range. They are reproduced here verbatim and without comment.

The Long-term Multifold Trend of Western Culture

1. Increasingly sensate (empirical, this-worldly, secular, humanistic, pragmatic, manipulative, explicitly rational, utilitarian, contractual, epicurean, hedonistic, etc.) cultures
2. Bourgeois, bureaucratic, and meritocratic elites
3. Centralization and concentration of economic and political power
4. Accumulation of scientific and technical knowledge
5. Institutionalization of technological change, especially research, development, innovation, and diffusion

⁴⁴Baldwin, 297, 298.

⁴⁵Baldwin, 318, 319.

⁴⁶Baldwin, 326.

⁴⁷Baldwin, 331.

6. Increasing military capability
7. Westernization, modernization, and industrialization
8. Increasing affluence and (recently) leisure
9. Population growth
10. Urbanization, recently suburbanization and "urban sprawl"--soon the growth of megalopoli
11. Decreasing importance of primary and (recently) secondary and tertiary occupations; increasing importance of tertiary and (recently) quaternary occupations
12. Increasing literacy and education and (recently) the "knowledge industry" and increasing role of intellectuals
13. Innovative and manipulative social engineering--i.e. rationality increasingly applied to social, political, cultural, and economic worlds as well as to shaping and exploiting the material world--increasing problem of ritualistic, incomplete, or pseudo rationality
14. Increasing universality of the multifold trend
15. Increasing tempo of change in all the above

Final Third of Twentieth Century
(Relatively Apolitical and Surprise-Free Projection)

1. Continuation of basic, long-term "Multifold Trend"
2. Emergence of "Post-Industrial" culture
3. World-wide capability for modern technology
4. Need for world-wide "zoning ordinances" for control of arms, technology, pollution, trade and other areas
5. High (1 to 10%) growth rates in GNP/GDP
6. Increasing emphasis on "meaning and purpose"
7. Much turmoil in the "new" and possibly in the industrializing nations
8. Some possibility for sustained "nativist," messianic, or other mass movement
9. Second rise of Japan (to being potentially, nominally, or perhaps actually, the third largest power)
10. Some further rise of Europe and China
11. Emergence of new intermediate powers: Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Indonesia, East Germany, Egypt, etc.
12. Some decline (relative) of U.S. and Soviet Union
13. A possible absence of stark "life and death" political and economic issues in the "old nations"

**CONGRUENCE OF THE GENERAL FORECAST
 WITH THE GENERAL POLICY**

There are obvious if vague conflicts between the generalized policy objectives of USFP IV and the body of opinion represented in the forecasts which were used. First, there is the problem of contemporaneity.

USFP IV is "for the 1970's." Most of the forecast material, when a period is put to it, reaches out to 1985 or 2000. This basic difference, in addition to the official status of the policy document, may account for other differences seen.

Second, there is a distinct difference in perceptions of the world between USFP IV, on the one hand, and the forecasters taken as a body, on the other. The corporate Mr. Nixon is striving for a world in equilibrium, is expecting business-as-usual, with change in detail--micro-evolution. The forecasters see change, even profound change, as the norm; and entry into something called the "postindustrial age" seems a foregone conclusion. Mr. Nixon focuses on the relations between states when looking at the world beyond our borders. The forecasters seem to use a different focal length and find a world of trends--universal, if of varying rates--driven by the momentum of technology, rising aspirations, and evolving values. While Mr. Nixon is concerned with the identity and magnitude of a worst threat, the forecasters focus on likely developments, generally in a non-normative way. USFP IV provides goals, objectives, and priorities for action; the forecasters hope for rational manipulation of events without necessarily expecting it.

Soviet Union

The policy objectives with regard to the Soviet Union were found to be concerned with establishing a new economic and political relationship, and with ensuring our own security. The forecast materials reflected a generally pessimistic outlook for the Soviet system, although not for a lessening of its power. Her strategic requirements were seen to be a counterweight to China, a buffer in the west, and parity with the United States.

A quick comparative analysis of the policy objectives and the forecast review reveals no major problems. The policy seems to be based on an assumption of a continuing vigorous Soviet state, an assumption which does not clash seriously with the general thrust of the forecasts. While Brzezinski sees most serious problems ahead for the Soviet system in making the transition to the postindustrial or "technetronic" stage, Sorokin demonstrates the vitality and resiliency of the Russian nation.⁴⁸

There may be some conflict realized in the implementation of the objectives of forming a new relationship with the Soviets (putting the Cold War behind us) and restraining the growth of Soviet influence (different from "containment"?). One would expect such conflicts, if they exist, when the policy objectives are put to an operational test. There may be a similar conflict between the objectives of establishing a new relationship and the forecast of a generational succession conflict--at the very least, it imposes a requirement on the United States for considerable agility in the 1980's.

The generally high degree of congruence between objectives and forecasts would seem to reflect realism in the former and careful study of the latter by this Administration, and the academic and professional diplomatic communities which support it in the development of foreign policy.

India

The policy objectives with regard to India mainly reflected concern about India's growing dominance in South Asia and about her relation-

⁴⁸ Pitirim A. Sorokin, "The Essential Characteristics of the Russian Nation in the Twentieth Century," The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 370, National Character in the Perspective of the Social Sciences, March, 1967, pp. 99-115.

ship with the Soviet Union. The scanty forecast material emphasized India's desire to affirm her hegemony, to limit great power influence in the area, and to protect herself from China. See Figure 3.

Problems in reconciling policy objectives with the outlook are more obvious and difficult in regard to India than those found in dealing with the world at large or with the Soviet Union. Some are due to the calendar, some to paucity of material (or to choice of material--in either case this leaves the possibility of their being more apparent than real), and some to both; but some are due to substantial policy problems.

Material. First, there is the problem of the dating of the material. Only the pieces by the three Indian writers on strategy--Chopra, Sondhi, and Singh--postdate the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 (see Appendix D); therefore, they alone reflect the considerable changes in status--more especially, of perceptions of status--which resulted from that conflict. Secondly, it proved difficult to find any discussion of the future of the Indian sub-continent extending beyond the mid-range period, with the exception of the Hudson Institute "Overview." (On the other hand, this resulted in greater temporal congruence between the "forecasts" and USFP IV.) Next, the representativeness of the Indian writers may be more suspect than is generally true of the other forecasters used in this paper; although a senior Indian Army officer, in conversation with the writer, has

characterized Sondhi as "reasonable", Singh as "radical", and Chopra as "eclectic." They were needed, however, to balance the extreme views of Baldwin⁴⁹ and the generalities of Kahn. Finally, it is noted that none of the sources consulted dealt significantly with India's demographic, economic, or internal political status.

Power Relationships. First, of course, there is the obvious fact that, if stability is being sought in a three-cornered relationship, the addition of another power to one corner is destabilizing. This was reflected in an assertion that (no facetiousness intended) the United States must back Pakistan, to counter India, which is a "potential threat" to China, which the U.S. needs to balance Russia, which is aligned with India. But to deny that India already enjoys a regional hegemony would be unrealistic. Another questionable area is India's ability to exercise any significant control in the Indian Ocean, as, to judge from the sources used, is her intent. Finally, in respect to U.S. fears, elaborately expressed by Baldwin, that India could be smothered in the Russian bear's embrace, one can only observe that in the nearly two decades of their close relationship there have been no indications to support such a fear.

Pique. This writer was troubled in studying USFP IV by what seemed to be indications of "policy by pique." Thus, "... we have expressed unhappi-

⁴⁹The same officer complained about Baldwin's assertion that, "... the first steps have been taken in the integration of ... the Indian military establishment--with the Russian," noting that Indian officers are sent to U.S. service schools, but not to Soviet.

ness when Indian leaders have used the United States as a scapegoat in domestic disputes, which does not serve our common objective of improved relations.⁵⁰ According to the writer's recollection "policy by pique" was widely suspected, at least in the press, at the time of the Seventh Fleet's sortie into the Indian Ocean during the 1971 war. However, in the time since the publication of USFP IV, several points at issue between the U.S. and India, such as the status of POW's, have been resolved. Further, the same Indian officer reported that, in conversation at the U.S. State Department in May 1974, he gained the impression that U.S. policy was rapidly being adjusted to accord with the new "facts" in South Asia. How such a new "realism" will deal with the question of India's "going nuclear" is unknown.

⁵⁰ U.S. President, 1969-- (Nixon), U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 147, 148.

CHAPTER V

TEST OF THE MODEL

INTRODUCTION

This Chapter contains two demonstrations of the operation of the Threat/Opportunity Matrix Model. See Figure 1. In the first, detailed descriptions are given of a United States policy objective and of a forecast theme with regard to the Soviet Union. Juxtaposed in a Threat/Opportunity Matrix (Figure 4), they are found to produce an informational objective and an EEI (indicated by an "X"). In the final step, the EEI is subjected to target analysis and the results reported. In the second demonstration, the same process is begun with an objective and a theme concerning India. In this case, however, no informational objective was identified (indicated by an "O" on the Matrix), and the demonstration ends with the juxtaposition of the theme and objective. The presentation of these two cases is intended to illustrate what happened when all 69 grid squares of the Soviet and Indian Threat/Opportunity Matrixes were examined. Discussion of the other 67 is found in Appendixes C through F, divided according to stages of the process (establishment of objectives, identification of themes and trends, etc.)

CASE 1

The Objective: A New Economic Relationship

The considerable effort expended on trade agreements at (and prior to) the Moscow Summit appears to have had a dual objective: to

form a part of the warp and woof of the new relationship; and to gain more immediate, purely economic advantages by exploiting the complementarity of the Soviet and American economies. (p. 38) Of these two, the former was considered to have priority. (p. 33) After describing the trade agreements in his Report (p. 34), President Nixon goes on to assert that, "these agreements open the way not only for a prompt invigoration of trade but also for developing these relations into a permanent component of the overall relationship projected at the summit. It is not a question of whether certain elements should be separable, or conditional [as the Jackson Amendment would have them], but whether we wish the entire process of a broadly based new relationship with the Soviet Union to unfold." (p. 35) But, further, "the Soviet Union has vast natural resources, such as natural gas, that can be developed with the help of American capital and technology. These resources would then be available for export to the United States, thus enabling the Soviet Union to repay our credits and pay for imports from the United States ... such ventures ... establish an interdependence between our economies which provides a continuing incentive to maintain a constructive relationship." (p. 35)

The Forecast, Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United States

This writer accepts, at least for the purpose of this paper, Morton H. Halperin's contention that, with respect to the U.S., the Soviet goal is nuclear parity, not superiority. They also appear to be determined not to allow the marked U.S. superiority which existed in the 1960's, and would "race" to prevent its recurrence. The Soviet doctrine also emphasizes the critical importance of surprise and of the first strike,

and the importance of command and control, for internal political reasons among others.¹ Apropos the arms race, Thomas C. Shelling observes that, "the longer the run considered, the more the arms race takes on the character of a two-sided adaptive system, rather than a pair of unilateral programs."² Tyrus W. Cobb shares this view of the role of action and reaction, believing that the Kremlin has no "master plan" for detente, but that its future course will be based as much on our actions as on theirs.³ The prospects of general and complete disarmament, as contrasted with arms control, are significantly reduced by the U.S. insistence on mechanisms for enforcement and arbitration, for this would require a political decision-making institution, which the UN does not provide, and which is not apt to exist in the foreseeable future.⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, as usual, sees matters through a somewhat different lens. He sees the U.S.-Soviet rivalry becoming less intensive but more extensive.⁵ Some of the policy implications he lists are as follows: "a posture based on ideological considerations has become dated; an American-Soviet axis is not likely to be the basis for a new international system; traditional

¹ Morton H. Halperin, Defense Strategies for the Seventies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), pp. 58, 59.

² Thomas C. Shelling, "Managing the Arms Race," Problems of National Strategy (ed. Henry A. Kissinger; New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 375.

³ Tyrus W. Cobb, "The Durability of Detente," Military Review, April, 1974, p. 15.

⁴ Laurence W. Martin, "Peaceful Settlement and Peaceful Change," The United States in A Disarmed World: A Study of the U.S. Outline for General and Complete Disarmament (Arnold Wolfers et al.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 91ff.

⁵ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 282.

spheres of influence are increasingly unviable; economic determinism in regard to the less developed countries or to the communist states does not provide a sound basis for policy; regional alliances against individual nations are becoming obsolescent ..."⁶

The Threat/Opportunity Area: T/O 2g: New Economic Relationship Versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United States

While we wish to pursue a closer economic relationship primarily for our own political purposes, in economic terms it is more of seller's market, our having what the Soviets want. On the other hand, certain of the items of technology which the Soviets want have strategic significance. To permit trade in some of these goods may be adjudged as simply too threatening to our strategic position--and the refusal too threatening to the Soviet strategic position--and the grounds for confrontation will have been established. An informational objective thereby suggests itself: It is critical to the attainment of our objective to know whether the Soviets would inject considerations of force in order to gain some leverage over our decisions as to what goods, services, or technology will be permitted trade items. The suggested wording for the EEI: In regard to what items would the Soviet Union contemplate the use or threat of force to ensure freedom to trade; where, in what manner, and to what degree? See Figure 4.

⁶Brzezinski, p. 285.

		outlook for Soviet system				strategic requirements		
		a ideological retreat	b economic/ technical needs	c fear and rigidity	d generational succession	e China	f Europe	g United States
new relation- ship	deideologization 1.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	new economic relationship 2.	0	0	0	0	0	0	x
ensuring: security	survival 3.	x	x	0	0	x	0	0
	reduced cost 4.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	reassurance of allies 5.	0	0	0	0	x	x	0
	E, Europe 6.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	restrain growth of Soviet influence 7.	0	0	x	x	x	x	0

Figure 4

Identification of Informational Objectives
in Threat/Opportunity Matrix, Soviet Union

Target Analysis

"In regard to what items would the Soviet Union contemplate the use or threat of force to ensure freedom to trade; where, in what manner, and to what degree?" (Source: T/O area 2g: new economic relationship versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to the United States; T/O area 3b: survival versus economic/technical needs.)

Cost-benefit analysis.

Target: The answers to this EEI would have to be sought at an extremely high-level, surely not below the ministerial (and intimates) level. Both the gravity of the decision, and the need for access to a wide variety of information of high validity to support that decision lead to this conclusion. The latter factor would also indicate that the information could be sought in any ministry or comparable organization dealing with general military-industrial planning, control, or data generation. In that organizational environment, a person must be sought who has access to and understanding of state decision-making on the highest level, as well as one who enjoys the trust and freedom to communicate. An extremely narrow and difficult target.

Time: This is a present and continuing need, but will assume increasing criticality as the "new economic relationship" broadens and deepens. ^Tt, in effect, is "as soon as possible." ^Tt, that being the case, cannot be met, strictly speaking, barring the appearance of a voluntary informant, as Oleg Penkovskii is said to have been. Taking the more reasonable view that the threat will be not very viable until several years of growth in the economic relationship have passed, it would seem possible to identify one or more individuals, in an appropriate position,

if they exist, and employ them within the mid-range (two to ten years) period. In this regard, it should be noted that Guenther Guillaume required 14 years (1956-1970, not including selection and training) to gain comparable access in Bonn, according to Time magazine (6 May 1974, p. 34), starting as a complete outsider.

Risk: The risk does not exceed that normally inherent to any espionage operation; that is to say, it is not great (aside from temporary embarrassment), provided the target government has no particular need to exploit disclosure of the operation and the instigating government responds coolly. Risk can be traded for time, provided skilled operating personnel are available, e.g. one could attempt an overture to a Soviet believed to have direct or indirect access to the desired information, on the basis of less information about him than could have been obtained had more time been spent in researching the matter.

Cost-effectiveness analysis.

Photint: General information on the state of Soviet military-industrial capabilities can be obtained. Recognition of, concern about, and intent to resolve problems cannot be detected.

Sigint: An extremely high capability would be required to collect against such an EEI, (due to the level of decision-making) and then only after matters had progressed to the point where signal communications were being used to discuss them.

Exploitative Humint: Some information can be obtained about the state of Soviet military-industrial capabilities. Some information can be obtained, if the Soviets decide to signal it, about problem recognition and attempts to solve it--probably after matters have progressed rather far in decision-making circles.

Conclusion: Data concerning need for items of trade could be produced by any of the general collection means discussed. Only controlled Humint, and that with great difficulty, could produce timely information on problem recognition, discussion, and resolution at the appropriate decision-making level.

CASE 2

The Objective:

Prevention of dominance by a single regional power. This theme dominates the discussion of South Asia, at least from the standpoint of reiteration and volume. The traumatic event, of course, was the 1971 war which resulted in Indian hegemony on the subcontinent, a fact alluded to in USFP IV:

"India emerged from the 1971 crisis with new confidence, power, and responsibilities. This fact in itself was a new political reality for the subcontinent and for all nations concerned with South Asia's future. For the nations of that region, the question was how India would use its power. For the nations outside the region, the question was what the relationship of this power would be to that of other powers in the world.

"Because India is a major country, her actions on the world stage necessarily affect us and our interests." (p. 147)⁷

However,

"Every country on the subcontinent has a basic right to determine its own destiny without interference or dominance by any other. The United States places a high value on this right, out of conviction and out of our interest in a peaceful regional system. Every major power--now including India, with its new power in the region--has a basic responsibility toward the international system to exercise its power with restraint, so that these smaller nations may look to the future confident of their security and independence." (p. 150)

⁷Page numbers in parentheses refer to USFP IV.

The Administration views the 1971 war, not as an adjustment of political forms to political facts, but as a dangerously destabilizing event:

"In 1971 the breakdown of peace in South Asia not only brought war and suffering to the millions of people directly affected. It raised concern about stability for the whole region from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia. It involved the great powers in a potentially dangerous confrontation whose significance went far beyond the immediate South Asian conflict.

"Today we can hope that the subcontinent has found a new foundation for stability.

"This will depend first and foremost on the normalization of relations between India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh ... it means consolidating a new stability on the subcontinent; an end to the arms race; an end to territorial disputes; expanded economic cooperation; and creation of a climate of security and, ultimately, reconciliation." (p. 144)

"Encouragement of turmoil within nations on the subcontinent can bring not only the devastation of civil and international war, but the involvement of outside powers". (p. 145)

In implementation of this view:

"As a general matter, reconciliation on the subcontinent is not a process the United States can directly affect, except to give encouragement and support to constructive actions." (pp. 144, 145)

"Our policy now, as before 1971, is to permit the export of non-lethal equipment and of spare parts for equipment previously supplied by the United States. There is no change in our purpose. We are not participating in an arms race in the subcontinent." (p. 146)

The Forecast: Relations with the Great Powers

Maharaj K. Chopra describes the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971 as reflecting a relationship developed over 15 years; and believes that, although not a true alliance, it may have deterred the PRC from intervention in the October 1971 war

with Pakistan.⁸ Hanson W. Baldwin expresses his concern at length over the relationship with the Soviets. In his survey of the lands "East of Suez", he states that, "despite the rugged terrain, overland communication routes from the Central Asian area to South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral have been intensively developed by both Russia and China."⁹ Further, "a weak and fragmented Congress Party ... and the menace of Chinese Communism, plus large sums of money and an Indian predilection for socialist slogans and sophistry, have helped Russia make deep inroads into India ... All this Soviet effort has not persuaded New Delhi to relinquish--at least in policy statements--her policy of nonalignment. But actually the first steps have been taken in the integration of the Indian economy--and the Indian military establishment--with the Russian ... Today the nightmare of Indian foreign policy is the specter of a U.S. rapprochement with China ..." [this in 1970]¹⁰

Suffice it to say that the PRC is viewed by Indian strategists with implacable fear and hatred. Halperin says of the Chinese: "Most important to them is the establishment of China as a major world, and nuclear, power. Peking also envisions the establishment of Chinese hegemony in Asia ... and recognition by all Asian countries of China's dominance."¹¹ This view is reinforced by Vernon D. Aspaturian who says

⁸ Maharaj K. Chopra, "India's Strategic Environment," Military Review, June, 1973, pp. 32, 33.

⁹ Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 207.

¹⁰ Baldwin, pp. 211-213.

¹¹ Halperin, p. 70.

that China is now seeking an identity in an international system it has always scorned,¹² and that, even though the U.S. and the Soviet Union may be disenchanted, this does not necessarily mean that China will not accept a role at the top.¹³

United States-Indian relations have always been complex and marked by misunderstanding, often bitterness. Americans are baffled by Indians. We admired Gandhi and Nehru; we respect the "world's largest democracy"; we send grain and The Pill--and yet K. Brahma Singh can flatly charge us with being an "enemy of democracy."¹⁴ Chopra is somewhat more charitable and describes it as a "love-hate" relationship.¹⁵ Joseph H. De Rivera gives us an example of an early misunderstanding, which occurred in 1950: "... many Americans, embittered by India's refusal to send troops to Korea, did not realize that India's reluctance was due to the Formosan intervention [by the United States Seventh Fleet] and its concern that this move would alienate the Chinese. As a result, some pressure was applied to try to influence India's decision. In turn, Indians began to feel that strings were being attached to American aid."¹⁶ Chopra views the application of the Nixon Doctrine to South and Southeast Asia in this way: Noting that United States "withdrawal" creates a partial vacuum, he goes on to say, however, that, "while the United States is withdrawing, it continues to be a superpower. It would prevent the domination of a

¹² Vernon D. Aspaturian, "The USSR, the USA and China in the Seventies," Military Review, January, 1974, p. 53.

¹³ Aspaturian, p. 55.

¹⁴ K. Brahma Singh, "India and the Balance of Power," Military Review, April, 1974, p. 42.

¹⁵ Chopra, p. 32.

¹⁶ Joseph H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1968), p. 92.

single power in the region, insist upon open seas and seek secure communications. India realizes this and may even look upon U.S. presence of this kind as a plus entry in its security balance sheet.¹⁷ His compatriot, K.B. Singh, strongly disagrees. He sees the United States, the Soviet Union, and China contending on the Indian subcontinent as they are everywhere else. He reports that Indians were shocked by the move of the Seventh Fleet in 1971 "into the Bay of Bengal against the Indian Navy" (Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in a press conference on 30 November 1973, stated that these were "regular movements", which "will continue with more frequency,"¹⁸ by the fact of the U.S. rapprochement with China; and that the U.S. had closed its eyes to Pakistani "barbarism." He goes on to say that, because the U.S. cannot permit a Moscow-New Delhi axis to overbalance a Washington-Peking axis, the U.S. must act now to strengthen Pakistan.¹⁹

The Threat/Opportunity Area: T/O 1 b: Prevention of Dominance versus Great Power Relations

The emergence of India as the dominant regional power provides the Soviet Union with a counterweight to China on the latter's south flank. The identity of interests with the Soviet Union gives to India perhaps her only hope of security from China, particularly since the

¹⁷Chopra, p. 32.

¹⁸James R. Schlesinger, Department of Defense Morning News Briefing, 30 November, 1973.

¹⁹Singh, p. 42, 43.

United States has aligned herself with China in opposition to Russia (in the regional equation). These perceptions shape the problem for the United States. Regional dominance is important to India because it is important to Russia, her protector. India, for her own security, must remain the object of great power suits in South Asia and the Indian Ocean. How she intends to use her power status to manipulate great power positions in the region is of great importance to the United States. However, this subject of interest relates more to our objectives of excluding great power influence from the area, than to the prevention of regional dominance, which is already a fact. In the restricted context, this T/O area therefore fails to meet the criterion of criticality. No informational objective. See Figure 5.

		power status			
		regional hegemony	great power relations	Indian Ocean role	new weaponry
		a.	b.	c.	d.
political objectives	prevention of dominance 1.	X	0	0	0
	exclusion of great powers 2.	0	0	0	0
	alliances 3.	0	X	0	0
	idealism 4.	0	0	0	0
	economy 5.	0	0	0	0

Figure 5

Identification of Informational Objectives
in Threat/Opportunity Matrix, India

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

INTRODUCTION

In this Chapter the test scenarios (objectives plus trends) and the test of the model itself will be critically examined to see to what degree the criteria for success were met. Matters other than the determination of targets which came to light in the course of the test will also be discussed, as will the relationship of what was learned to the most relevant material found in the review of related literature, the remarks of Roger Hilsman.

THE SCENARIO

The first problem which arises in this scheme is the implication of rigidity in the relationship of policy to intelligence. In this paper, intelligence tasks were derived from a policy statement. No implication was intended that the substance of USFP IV was created without the prior and continuing support of the intelligence community, or that intelligence activity is initiated only upon completion of a policy position. Presumably the Nixon foreign policy, as expressed in USFP IV, was based on good intelligence, and its adjustment over time continues to be supported by that same good intelligence. Policy formulation, intelligence direction, and intelligence activity is recognized as a cyclical process; it was convenient to enter that cycle between intelligence input and announcement of policy.

Nation-states were chosen as target areas. For test purposes this worked well, and has the further advantage of being a frame of reference which is familiar. Conceivably, however, a regional, topical, level-of-development, or even a racial target area would have greater long-range value, in view of the forecast evolutionary changes in the organization of the globe.

The shortcomings of the material used have already been discussed, but bear reiteration. USFP IV, published in May 1973, is already outdated in some respects, but it had not been superseded at the time of writing. Forecast material is, of course, obsolescent on the day of publication, but in this case many of the most comprehensive and relevant works, with the exception of some of the articles from periodicals, were distressingly old.

In analyzing USFP IV for objectives and in comparing those objectives to forecast trends it was necessary to assume a certain order of priority among them. Some of the priorities assigned, e.g. national survival as a top priority objective, will be accepted with ease; others may not.

An "open-ended" time frame for the scenario was considered to be impractical. As it turned out, however, the scenario was, if not open-ended, then certainly very vague as to its term. While USFP IV is "for the 1970's", the forecast material overall simply would not permit such an exact delimitation. This caused other problems which are discussed below.

THE TEST

Threats and Opportunities

The idea of an intelligence officer examining national policy objectives and the environment for threats and opportunities bears a strong resemblance to the scheme examined and discarded by Roger Hilsman,¹ although he is concerned primarily with intelligence researchers rather than collectors. He regarded it as extravagant (duplicative of the effort of policy-makers) and useless. His first contention may be supported by this paper; the second is arguable. In a time of such awesome intelligence collection capabilities, the intelligence problem is no longer--as it has been for thousands of years--collection, but rather focus and use of the product. For this reason any scheme which promises amelioration of the problem of focusing the effort seems worthy of examination. Even Hilsman admits that a special relationship necessarily exists between the "legman" (collector) and the policy analyst, as an exception to his conclusion that intelligence should not be overly concerned with the analysis of policy.

Informational Objectives and EET

The Threat/Opportunity Matrix system of searching for informational objectives has certain limitations, inherently and as applied. Since it is derivative from judgementally-based policy objectives and forecast trends, there is an opportunity for cumulative error.

¹ Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 167, 168.

The role of controlled Humint as a collection system cannot be comprehensively examined in this system because of the criterion of criticality. Since only EEI are sought, the possible tasking of controlled Humint to satisfy other intelligence requirements (OIR), as defined in FM 30-5, goes unexamined.

The most serious problem, however, lies in the designation of the informational objectives. The criterion of criticality is applied solely through the writer's judgment; among the 69 T/O areas examined it is likely that a hundred different writers would produce a hundred different patterns of "X's" and "0's". It is worth noting, for example, that in this paper every informational objective was generated as the result of a Threat, not an Opportunity, although the theoretical possibility exists.

Aside from the judgemental component, there were mechanical problems with the system of deriving informational objectives. Although there were obvious horizontal, vertical, and diagonal relationships between many of the Threat/Opportunity grid squares, the examination for informational objectives was rigidly confined within the bounds of each individual grid square. This resulted in some apparently anachronistic findings, such as that no informational objective existed in Soviet Union T/O area 3g, the intersection of the "survival" objective with the "Soviet strategic requirements in regard to the United States" forecast. This finding was based entirely on acceptance of the forecast that the Soviet requirement amounted to no more than parity. As a matter of interest, the reasons for failure to find an informational objective in 57 of the 60 T/O areas are summarized below:

1. Twenty-eight met neither criterion (criticality, force implications).

2. Nine met the criterion of criticality, but not the criterion of force implications.

3. Five met the criterion of force implications, but not that of criticality.

4. Fifteen were nonfunctional; that is, no relationship was seen between the objective and the trend, or the interaction was seen as a subset to another T/O area.

Referring to Figure 4 (Identification of Informational Objectives in Threat/Opportunity Matrix, Soviet Union), some observations are offered on the disposition of the "X's", symbolizing positive findings in the analysis for informational objectives. First, it should be noted that the preponderance of "hits" were found in the two horizontal columns labeled "survival" (3) and "restrain growth of Soviet influence" (7), accounting for seven of the ten informational objectives. This is not surprising, as conflict with our only fully competitive rival is implicit in these two policy objectives. It is also worth noting that, of the vertical columns, column "e", "strategic requirements, China", accounted for three of ten "hits". One vertical column had two; the balance had one each. This indicates that the future of the Sino-Soviet relationship was seen as potentially more threatening to our national security than any other long range trend affecting the Soviet Union.

Finally, a word about the general structure of the matrix and how the informational objectives relate to it. The matrix divides into four major divisions, delineated by the interaction of objectives and trends, each grouped under two major subheadings. This is more clearly seen in Figure 6, below. The percentages shown indicate the proportion of T/O areas within the major square which yielded informational objectives;

	Non- Force	Force
	outlook for Soviet system	Soviet strategic requirements
Non- Force	new relationship	None 17%
Force	ensuring security	20% 33%

Figure 6

Threat Levels in Interaction of US Objectives
and Soviet Trends

thus, in the clash of our major objective of ensuring our security with the forecast Soviet strategic requirements, five of the 15 T/O areas, or 33% yielded informational objectives. The labels "force" and "non-force" have been added to the columns to highlight the fact that when the T/O major square seems to have less force implication it tends to yield fewer informational objectives. In this case, the relationship is as predicted; the "force"- "force" intersection is the highest, and the "non-force"- "non-force" intersection is the lowest. The Indian T/O matrix (Figure 5) is not nearly as interesting to analyze, except to note that both of the derived informational objectives appeared in the clash of our political objectives and the Indian drive toward being the major regional actor. Note also that the Indian matrix produced informational objectives at only half the rate of the Soviet matrix (10% versus 20%), presumably a result of the operation of the criticality factor.

Targets

Targets of the specificity envisioned in Chapter II were not produced in this test. Even accepting the high judgemental content of the analysis, the most that can be said is that something in between an EEI and a target was found. This entity, which we will call a "target type", was of a scope appropriate to determination of the composition of the intelligence collection attack. To have carried the analysis down to the target level would have required quantities of data and expertise beyond the scope of this work and the competence of the writer. Thus, while the logical structure of the analysis of policy and trends produced something, it was not targets, but an intermediate "target type".

Table 1 displays a qualitative analysis of the twelve target types derived from the analysis of T/O area-derived informational objectives. The factors measured are based on the cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analyses. The categorization of degree appears more exact than it is, in light of the narrative form which was used to describe the impact of the factor. Some interesting phenomena appear in this Table: Given the nature of the EEI, it is not surprising that the targets for both target areas were believed to be generally narrow and high level. Time was a problem. In the eight instances in the Soviet Union in which $T_o > T_t$, the reason was usually that the EEI reflected a current requirement. Therefore, by definition, not even an "instant capability" would overcome the theoretical problem. The more favorable results in India are apparently due to the fact that her potential is of more concern than her actual power. Risk was uniformly high; the Indian operation counted as "dangerous" was one (T/O 3b) in which the conduct of the operation itself was considered threatening to attainment of the objective. Photint capability was seen as generally good, and rather better against the more highly developed Soviet Union. Sigint capability was potent also, but at a relative disadvantage against these kinds of EEI. The capability of exploitative Humint was the approximate equal of controlled Humint, especially against the more open Indian society. The overall system choice (conclusion) favored a mixed attack, with Photint and Sigint making the greatest contribution on capabilities, exploitative Humint on trends, and controlled Humint on intentions.

Table 1
Qualitative Analysis of Target Types

<u>Factor</u>	<u>Degree</u>	<u>Soviet Union</u>	<u>India</u>
Target			
	Very high level	6	2
	High level	3	
	Medium level	1	
	Very narrow	7	
	Narrow	1	2
	Broad	2	
Time			
	$T_o < T_t$	2	1
	$T_o > T_t$	8	1
Risk			
	Normal	4	
	High	6	1
	Dangerous		1
System capability:			
Photint	High	3	
	Some	4	1
	None	3	1
Sigint			
	High	1	
	Some	9	2
	None		
Exploitative Humint			
	High	6	2
	Some	3	
	None	1	
Conclusion (choice of system)			
	Controlled Humint	2	
	Mixed	7	1
	Other than controlled Humint	1	1

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One conclusion was evident as a result of this test: Although the identification of target types was based on the assumed system characteristics described in Chapter I, and Appendix A, the procedure is more art than science. It is quite likely that persons with experience in these matters could present valid arguments for conclusions differing slightly from those found in this paper, depending primarily on the depth of their experience with the target areas.

In spite of the talk one hears to the contrary, it was not difficult to identify rather specific objectives in the Nixon document. Nor was it difficult to identify major themes in a wide variety of forecast material; although, of course, some contradictory views were found.

The results of the test were mixed: Although the data and method used did not support the hypothesis that targets could be found by analyzing objectives, trends, and system characteristics, some tools of analysis were tried that produced interesting results and pointed toward a new concept which was called the "target type."

Further study is recommended in three areas:

1. The Threat/Opportunity matrix system of comparing policy objectives with environmental trends needs further study in order to correct the problem of rigidity. Some systematic way of going beyond the bounds of the T/O area, or of analyzing relationships between T/O areas needs to be found, if this system is to have significant value as a tool of analysis.

2. The "target type" concept shows promise as a tool for the management of collection systems. It should be tested against a highly

detailed scenario, which was not possible here, to see if it facilitates the identification of targets or target elements.

3. Nine of the Threat/Opportunity areas failed to produce informational objectives because the criterion of force implications was not met. This criterion was imposed in order to make the study of more interest to the Defense intelligence community. If it were removed, the model might have broader application, especially since this would probably result in greater attention to the opportunities aspect of the Threat/Opportunity Matrix.

APPENDIX A

EXPANDED BASIC ASSUMPTION: CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTION METHODS

INTRODUCTION

One of the most stubborn problems in the field of intelligence management is the difficulty of deciding on a rational basis the manner in which available collection means should be applied to the attainment of an informational objective. To demonstrate fully how to solve this problem would require that every one of a long series of eliminative decisions be identified and that the range of alternatives at each of these points be fully described. Such a treatment would be encyclopedic. This discussion will be focussed on a rational approach to the decision to task the human intelligence (Humint) collection system.

The process of relating a given informational objective to a given intelligence capability is based upon a consideration of the nature of the objective and the characteristics and cost of the technique. To move from establishment of the informational objective to publication of a collection tasking directive involves a three--stage translation process.

First, the informational objective must be analyzed. In the course of this analysis, means of access to the target will be identified. Thus, a need for substantive intelligence

has been translated into a target(s) for intelligence attack. Depending on the scope of the informational objective several may be identified.

Secondly, the target elements which hold promise of access are analyzed to determine the means which could be used to exploit that access. Thus, a detailed description of target vulnerabilities is translated into an "order of battle" for the attacking intelligence forces. Most targets can be attacked by most collection techniques with some degree of effectiveness. At this stage of the selection process we are trying to determine probability of success. That is, the determination should be in the form, "X technique has a Y% probability of answering Z% of the informational requirements". Desired form of output is also considered at this stage.

In the final step, this technical analysis of capabilities versus target elements is translated into a directive which tasks one or more capabilities with attack of the target or of individual elements of the target. This is done after a consideration of the results of the preceding analysis, of existing capabilities, and resources available to create new capabilities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTION SYSTEMS

Comparison of Humint with the technical or "machine" collection systems (photo and signals intelligence) reveals common characteristics, unique characteristics, and characteristics which differ in degree among the systems.

Common Characteristics

The characteristics common to all intelligence collection systems are fiscal feasibility (involving judgments rendered concerning cost versus worth), susceptibility to direction, ability to penetrate certain types of security safeguards, ability to sense, obtain, store, and report data, and ability to provide the intelligence analyst with some basis for evaluating the information collected.

Unique Characteristics

First and most obviously, the human collector can defeat a safeguard which is exclusively machine-oriented. Secondly, the human collector is sensitive to social stimuli. He is also uniquely capable of performing certain operational tasks, such as inspiring loyalty in the source of information or rendering an artistic judgement. Finally, he can report not only what has been said or done, but also feelings, moods, unarticulated consensus, trends. On the other hand, a machine can operate in an environment, such as space or ocean depths,

which is absolutely hostile to man, or in which he cannot survive without becoming in effect a part of a man-machine system. Also, a machine can manipulate massive amounts of data and construct reproducible logic chains at high speed, as well as sense phenomena not detectable by a human.

Differences of Degree

Every human collector has five, and to some degree, six senses. Most machine or technical collectors employ only one sensor and rarely more than two or three. The result is that, in favorable circumstances, a human collector is more apt than a machine collector to be able to confirm an observation without recourse to another collector. While a machine memory can generally be considered to be objective and infallible, it does not have the scope and sensitivity of the human memory. Virtually any controlled human collector can simultaneously collect, evaluate and retarget himself to some degree. This capability is both difficult and costly to obtain in a machine collector. A machine can report measurable phenomena and objects with very high accuracy. The capabilities and limitations of a machine are generally easier to understand, predict, and hence control. Their complexity, while it may baffle the layman, does not approach that of the human organism and psyche. Both types of collector must undergo research, development, test and evaluation. In the case

of a machine, this tends to be accomplished once, for the whole system, and prior to employment. In the case of the human collector, particularly the controlled one, "RDT&E" must be performed for and throughout virtually every application.

CHARACTERISTICS OF HUMINT TECHNIQUES

Structural Analysis

For the purposes of this paper, the Humint system is defined as consisting of four source--oriented subsystems: persons, documents, material, and environment. Each subsystem operates through the application of one of two techniques, the controlled or the exploitative. Often there may be no clearly discernible line between the two techniques. For reasons which will become apparent, the controlled technique will be considered by the authorities of the target country to be illegal, and must therefore be applied in secrecy. Put another way: Any Humint collection activity which is disliked by the target country and subject to their influence will require the application of the controlled technique, which lends itself to secrecy.

Characteristics Shared by the Controlled and Exploitative Techniques

In keeping with their common identity as Humint collection techniques, controlled and exploitative operations have

certain common characteristics. They include an ability to--

1. exercise judgement in the course of the collection activity and redirect the effort without prior "programing",
2. report the nuances of social intercourse and non-verbal communication,
3. judge the probable veracity of the source or, at any rate, his (the source's) confidence in the validity of the information being imparted,
4. employ ground sensors in a denied area ,
5. obtain interior descriptions of covered and/or camouflaged facilities, and ,
6. obtain clear text versions of encrypted or enciphered transmissions,

Differences of Degree

Controlled operations are conducted with a very high degree of discretion. This characteristic sets them apart from all other intelligence collection operations. It also dictates the application of the controlled technique to all Humint operations which require the exercise of a high degree of discretion. The requirement for discretion arises from one or more of the following dangers: the danger of embarrassment to the sponsor in the event of compromise; the danger of losing a source of information whose position is extremely insecure; the danger of losing control of the source

to the opponent; the danger of alerting and further strengthening the already strong defenses customarily associated with the targets of controlled Humint activity.

Perhaps the most important difference to bear in mind is in the targeting phase of operations. The exploitative technique, as its name implies, is a passive one in the sense that we exploit knowledge of the target which has been gained for reasons other than by our direction. The information typically provided through exploitation of a source is related to the informational objective by coincidence, not by design. The secret operator, on the other hand, may have an ability to expose and re-expose his controlled informant to the chosen intelligence collection target.

The time required to develop a successful controlled operation would not only be generally lengthy but also generally fixed in relation to a given target. This is due to the relative immutability of human nature, and to the relatively fixed relationships between importance of the target to the collector, the defenses erected around it by the foreign power, and the collection resources (including time) required to reduce the target.

In terms of informant personnel, as often as not, a person may have to be sought who, in addition to other

qualifications functionally related to the collection task (such as proximity to the target), must be willing to betray his country and/or to expose himself to extreme danger.

There is a comparatively large volume of sources available to exploitative Humint. For example, it is reported that during the period 1 January 1966 to 30 September 1969, 15.8 million pages of captured documents were received by the Combined (RVN-US) Document Exploitation Center in Saigon. Of these, 1.3 million pages were exploited.¹

There is a subtle difference in the respective "developmental" periods of controlled and exploitative operations which must be taken into account. The "development" requisite to exploitative operations is the development of the necessary linguistic and technical skills, the time spent waiting for an opportunity to present itself, and in some cases, the diplomatic negotiations and the development of facilities required to accommodate the activity. In other words, an important part of the development of an exploitative operation would lie in the investment in assets which are flexible, reusable, largely under your control, and relatively permanent

¹Data obtained from Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army in April 1970.

and thus easier to justify to the resource manager. However, it is only a slight exaggeration to say that during the development of a controlled operation, the bulk of the controller's effort would be spent getting to know many people who will be of no use to him, in order to identify one informant who is likely to be difficult to direct, limited in application, and very mortal. The developmental phase of a controlled operation would be, therefore, relatively expensive, viewed in terms of return.

Cost is a consideration of importance in contrasting the two types of operations. Cost, however, can only be understood in relation to the value of what is gained from the expenditure. In the present state-of-the-art such a comparison is inhibited by several factors when discussing Humint operations: the meaning of value, variance in targets, acceptance and validity, and the gratuitous capability.

The value of intelligence information is dependent upon the criticality of the informational objective to which it is related. Criticality, in turn, is defined here as the degree to which fulfillment of the objective would permit the decision-maker to plan and direct with confidence. No way has yet been found to measure or cost this factor with precision.

A further complicating factor is the variance in the targets against which each of the two techniques would logi-

cally directed. Theoretically, there would be no target or target element which exploitative techniques would not be capable of successfully attacking, to include the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet. On the other hand, these activities could more than justify their cost through the exploitation of a myriad of lesser target elements. And there is no technical bar to targeting a controlled informant against cost-of-living information available to the average citizen of the hostile country. One assumes, however, that the risks implicit in the commission of espionage would not be lightly incurred. Properly directed, the controlled informant would be targeted in accordance with the characteristics of his technique. This would mean that his target is very limited so that he can gain and maintain his access to it with an acceptable risk of compromise. It could also mean, for example, that he is instructed never to report unless a prescribed event takes place. In this case, his production of reports will likely (even hopefully) be nil, but his value as a reporting capability is unaffected. Because each technique tends to focus on targets of differing value and nature, it becomes infeasible to attempt to compare them with each other on anything resembling a "unit cost" basis (pending the reduction of all target valuations to a common unit of measure). In other words, while cost of the capability can be determined

with some precision, the value of the expected product cannot. Thus, it may be said that, in a sense, one pays for controlled collection capability, as opposed to exploitative production.

Acceptance (which, in practical terms, is the only "validity" the collector is concerned with) of the intelligence information report is dependent upon three factors: the state of our information holdings concerning the subject of the report, the reliability of the source, and the accuracy of the report (insofar as this can be extrinsically established). The state of our information is considered when the consumer answers the question, "Does this report answer any portion of an outstanding requirement?"

The reliability of the source is established through the degree to which his previous reporting has been accepted by the consumer. The logic of this arrangement is unassailable, but it raises practical difficulties. The exploitative operator deals, by and large, with one--time sources (with the important exception of periodicals and broadcasts) and therefore is denied the opportunity to establish the reliability of any single source. At best he can develop a (statistical) sense of the reliability of classes of sources. But then, the value of exploitative reporting lies in its volume, and thus its validity may be established intrinsically. The controlled collection operator, on the other hand, is rendered

susceptible to swindle or worse by the same rule (that reliability is established through acceptance of previous reporting). If the opposition knows the criteria by which an intelligence organization assigns reliability ratings, it can take advantage of this knowledge for its own ends.

As to the final factor, accuracy, every consumer must, of course, be cautioned against rejecting out of hand the "improbable" report. At the same time, it is important to remember that in exploitative operations it should almost always be only a matter of time before other sources will confirm or deny the "improbable" report since the sources in any given exploitative operation would tend to have approximately the same target exposure. If evidence or indications of the truth of a report obtained from a controlled informant are not already in hand, however, there is little that can be done to confirm or deny it. (For reasons of economy, the informant with unique access would be sought, and the failure to confirm the report's validity could not ipso facto be used as grounds to conclusively deny it).

Finally, the "gratuitous capability" or "serendipity" factor complicates the consideration of costs. In the course of exploitative operations, or even in the course of other military, aid, or diplomatic activities, a potential controlled informant could be identified. By eliminating

some of the slow and costly developmental activities which would otherwise be required to generate a controlled Humint operation, cost comparisons between the two techniques are radically altered.

SUMMARY

Intelligence collection capability requirements cannot be established independently of intelligence information requirements. An information requirement will imply certain targets which have characteristic vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities should then be compared with characteristics of various collection means. When this analysis is completed the appropriate collection capabilities should be tasked by means of a directive to the element having either the capabilities or the responsibility for establishing the capability. The operating collection element, therefore, is tasked with the reduction of an intelligence collection target, not, as might be supposed, with the satisfaction of an informational requirement. (By the same reasoning, the effectiveness of a collection element would, in all fairness, be measured as much if not more by its ability to establish and maintain a collection capability, as by its production rate. This is also supported by the fact that tasking, which is the link between capability and production, should be the prerogative of the

supported decision-maker, not of the operating collection element).

CONCLUSIONS IN REGARD TO APPLICATION OF HUMINT TECHNIQUES

Two Applications

The three-system (Humint, Photint, Sigint) structure described above leads to the conclusion that there can logically be primary and secondary applications of the Humint collection techniques: An application characterized as "primary" would be either an initial application (prior to the activation of another collection system), a sole application (instead of another collection system), or application in a "cueing" role (to generate sufficient operational data to permit the activation of another system). A "secondary" application would be made in order to confirm, deny, or further illuminate data generated through the operation of another system. In this paper, the discussion was limited to what have been termed "primary" applications, inasmuch as secondary applications involve a dependency on other systems.

Similarly, because the exploitative technique is, by definition, basically reactive, the long-ranged development of an exploitative capability cannot economically be narrowly focused. Nor does the development of an exploitative capability approach in complexity that of a controlled

capability. For these reasons, exploitative Humint collection tasks, were not studied in this paper.

Primary Applications

Based upon the analysis described above, general criteria for a primary application of the controlled Humint techniques may now be established.

Cost-benefit analysis (utility of controlled Humint): The intrinsic (most importantly, the "softness" of the data produced) and extrinsic (most importantly, the high political visibility of public disclosure) risks are outweighed by the expected gain (most importantly, access to intentions). The time to time-information-required is either sufficient for the technique to be properly applied to the specified target or not a factor (e.g. the target activity is expected to continue indefinitely).

Cost-effectiveness analysis (comparison of collection methods): The target elements generate no measurable trace or signature, the trace cannot be sensed within the state-of-the-art or feasible cost, or open sources are not available. Typically, the target element does not generate earth-scarring or electro-magnetic emissions which would be susceptible to examination, and the press of the target country publishes only that which the target leadership desires.

APPENDIX B.

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

INTRODUCTION

Nowhere was any direct reference found to the problem of identifying collection tasks for controlled Humint in the long-range time frame. Softening this stark finding, however, is the fact that a few very fragmentary and very peripheral observations on the subject were found. Some were less fragmentary or less peripheral than others. Notably Roger Hilsman, in his 1956 book, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions, discusses at length, although in an excessively convoluted manner, the relationship between intelligence and policymaking. His remarks in this regard are discussed separately below. The comments of other authors are grouped under three broad subject headings, following the discussion of Hilsman:

1. Guidance and the relationship of intelligence to policy.
2. Scope of collection and the effort against intentions.
3. The ability to see into the future.

Hilsman on the Tasking of Controlled Humint

Hilsman's work takes the form of reporting the results of a number of interviews with intelligence and policymaking officials, examining them, and drawing conclusions. In dis-

cussing the subject of the future, he found that one intelligence official tended to regard it as predetermined, and did not concern himself with suggesting ways of influencing it; but he found it hard to believe that other officials would consider it inevitable.¹ He concludes that, "if he believes in the usual division of labor [intelligence versus policy], the intelligence official must talk as if the future is inevitable, even if he does not really think it so."² He also found a marked interest in and sympathy for current intelligence as opposed to "long-haired" research.³ Under the heading, "Radical proposals," Hilsman notes that one official said that, "although prediction was difficult, intelligence should still try to predict the emergence of future problems," and felt that intelligence should lead policy.⁴ In sum, these "radicals" were suggesting a new role for intelligence, inconsistent with general convictions about the role of "facts" and the dangers of bias.⁵ Thus, if we are to have rational decisionmaking, the doctrines espoused by the interviewees ("boil down" the data, or "build up" the "jig-saw puzzle") cannot be right. It seems clear to Hilsman that one must ask a question, identify a concept, and

¹ Roger Hilsman, Strategic Intelligence and National Decisions (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), pp. 106,107.

² Hilsman, p. 108. ³ Hilsman, pp. 108,110. ⁴ Hilsman, pp. 115,116. ⁵ Hilsman, p. 118.

look for information indicated by the concept to answer the question. "The data, in sum, are not brought to the problem, but the problem is brought to the data."⁶

Hilsman believes that general guidance simply frustrates the intelligence officer, but that if very specific guidance is given, i.e. alternate policy options described, the intelligence officer, in order to winnow out the data that is applicable, ends up going through the same process of analysis as the decisionmaker.⁷

If the job of assembling information can only be done as an integral part of the job of analyzing a problem, then the wisest course would be assign the research intelligence agencies some sort of problem-analyzing functions and to distribute the work of assembling information on the different kinds of problems to the people who are responsible for analyzing each of these problems.

The function of collecting information however, as opposed to the function of assembling it, is more complicated. Since there will probably always be some kinds of information-collecting jobs that require special techniques, it will probably always be necessary to have divisions of labor that provide for a man who collects information outside the context of problem analysis--a legman who gathers information in relative independence with whatever guidance he can get. Into this category would fall the secret agent, the radio monitor who listens to foreign broadcasts looking for tidbits of information, and the document-screener who scans foreign publications and documents for the same purpose ... Legmen ... will probably always be needed, and so long as they can be given a list of very specific questions--steel production, order of battle, and so on--all will be well. But beyond this the legman will tend to be inefficient when compared with anyone who collects information within the context of problem analysis.

⁶Hilsman, pp. 163,164. ⁷Hilsman, pp. 164,166. ⁸Hilsman, pp. 167,168.

In discussing the "warning" (estimating) functions, in which he includes the determination of intentions, Hilsman has this to say:

...this role becomes the two steps of recognizing a problem and of making a preliminary analysis of it. Accordingly, and division of labor between the policy-making bureaus and intelligence based on this role, the steps in solving a problem would be as follows: (1) intelligence would set out to acquire a knowledge of the American values to be protected or enhanced or would be given this knowledge by the policymaking bureaus; (2) intelligence would look for the information indicated by its concepts and when some was found would make a preliminary analysis to determine whether the problem was a real one; (3) having identified a problem, intelligence would warn the policy-making bureaus by pointing out what the probable outcome of the problem would be and how it would affect American values; (4) the policymaking bureaus would then analyze the gains and costs of each.

The first and most obvious criticism one could make of this division of labor is that it would be extravagant ... A second criticism is that actually dividing the work might be very difficult to do ... The final, and probably most important criticism of this division of labor concerns its usefulness...⁹

The argument here ... sees the information-collecting role as belonging basically to the problem-analyzer (the decisionmaker himself, his official adviser, or anyone inside or outside government who advises the decision-maker or puts pressure on him). And it sees this role as being delegated in only two instances: (1) to the implementer ... and (2) to the legman when the job of collecting information requires special techniques ...¹⁰

⁹Hilsman, pp. 170,172. ¹⁰Hilsman, pp. 177,178.

Guidance and the Relationship of Intelligence to Policy

Aside from Hilsman's exhaustive but general treatment, very little was found on the problem of how long-range guidance should be furnished to the controlled Humint collector. Typical of the comments found are the dicta of Robert Glass and Phillip Davidson in their classic work, Intelligence Is For Commanders, written in 1948 (1952 edition cited).¹¹ In a context of tactical intelligence, they have this to say:

The direction of the collection effort covers three successive components: The essential elements of information, the collection plan, and specific directives or requests to collecting agencies. The essential elements of information consist of the additional information commander needs to govern the future conduct of his unit.¹² Based upon them the intelligence officer prepares a collection plan which will insure a coordinated search for the desired information. The collection plan is implemented by issuing specific directives to collecting agencies of the command and specific request to adjacent and higher headquarters.¹³

¹¹Unlike many of the authors, they are professional intelligence officers. They were both colonels in the United States Army in 1952, instructing at the USACGSC. Davidson retired as a lieutenant general; Glass as a major general.

¹²Note that this is a broader definition than that contained in the current FM 30-5, cited in Chapter II.

¹³Robert R. Glass and Phillip E. Davidson, Intelligence is for Commanders (2d ed; Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 6,8.

Sherman Kent addresses the problem briefly in Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (1949, 1966). His book too, is regarded as a classic, to judge from the frequency with which it was cited or acknowledged by other authors. He says, apropos the problems created by the requirement for secrecy, that

... if it allows the mechanisms of security to cut it off from some of the most significant lines of guidance, it destroys its own reason for existence. This guidance, in the nature of things, should come from two sources: it should come from the ultimate consumers direct^{/ly/}, or it should come from the ultimate consumer indirectly, through the overt part of the intelligence operation to which he (the consumer) has gone for help. As the relationship between the clandestine people and the direct and indirect consumers of their product is stopped down (as it may have to be for long periods)... some of its most important tasks become practically impossible ... The consumer may ask for something the organization is not set up to deliver, or he may ask for so wide a range of information that the totality of resources of the organization would be fully deployed for months, or he may ask for something which though procurable is not worth the effort ... It is constantly in danger of collecting the wrong information and not collecting the right.¹⁴

¹⁴ Sherman Kent, Strategic Intelligence for American World Policy (2d ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 167. This prompted Willmoore Kendall, in his review of Strategic Intelligence (World Politics, Vol. 1, Issue 4, (July 1949, pp. 542-552) to remark, "this tallies precisely with one of the present writer's major criticisms of our present intelligence arrangements" They enormously exaggerate the importance of covert collection, and yet permit it to yield shockingly small dividends."

David Cornwell (known pseudonymously as John Le Carre, author of inter alia, The Spy Who Came in from the Cold), remarked in an interview with Robert Deindorfer that, "the trouble is that so few governments know exactly what they want to achieve. And so only rarely can the intelligence service determine and then pursue its own targets."¹⁵ Whether USFP IV responds to Cornwell's premise is a matter of opinion.

Ladislas Farago says that, "an agent-at-large sent to a foreign country with instructions to obtain whatever he can, with no mission specified, is unlikely to produce date justifying the investment in time, money and effort."¹⁶

Scope of Collection and the Effort against Intentions

Farago and George Petree both recognize the extension of intelligence interest into fields the layman might (at the time they were writing) consider surprising. Farago coins the term "policy intelligence" to indicate the intelligence used to support decisionmaking at the highest level, above strategic, "operational," and tactical or combat intelligence.¹⁷

¹⁵Robert G. Deindorfer, "A Conversation with John Le Carre," Book-of-the-Month Club prospectus, April, 1974.

¹⁶Ladislas Farago, War of Wits: The Anatomy of Espionage and Intelligence (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1954), p. 175.

¹⁷Farago, p. 96.

Petree says that intelligence doctrine, when developed must "insist upon the recognition of complex relationships between various social, economic, political, or military and technical elements."¹⁸

The subject of collecting against intentions provokes considerable debate. First, those (all, save one, civilian) who generally consider intentions a valid collection objective will be reviewed; then, those (all, save one, military) who do not.

Washington Platt sees three "levels" of intelligence: status, capabilities, intentions. In describing the last named he says. "this question involves the Spirit of the People and an intimate knowledge of the given situation as a whole. A correct answer requires creative judgement and wisdom born of experience and mature study. Only a person well steeped in the national habits of thought and in the personalities concerned will have success in forecasting intentions--which is in part an exercise in mind reading."¹⁹ He also notes that intentions are of more concern in strategic intelligence than in combat intelligence.²⁰

¹⁸George Sawyer Petree, The Future of American Secret Intelligence (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946), p. 97.

¹⁹Washington Platt, Strategic Intelligence Production: Basic Principles (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), p. 62.

²⁰Platt, p. 67.

William H. McGovern agrees.²¹ Harry Howe Ransom says that the quest for intentions requires a combination of the social scientist and the "classical spy,"²² but also considers intentions as fundamentally "unknowable".²³

Christopher Felix (pseudonym) says both capabilities and intentions are objectives, but that ultimately intentions are the more important.²⁴ Donald Bletz, writing eleven years later in 1974, agrees, but believes the importance of intentions is a recent development. He ascribes this to the fact that, while in the Cold War the identity of the threat was obvious in a multipolar world it will be much less so.²⁵

The position of Glass and Davidson on the issue is very cautiously drawn:

... the enemy is physically capable of doing a great

²¹ William H. McGovern, Strategic Intelligence and the Shape of Tomorrow (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1961), p. 166.

²² Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 19.

²³ Ransom, p. 43.

²⁴ Christopher Felix (pseud.), A Short Course in the Secret War (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1963), p. 49.

²⁵ Donald F. Bletz, "How Much Force to Defend Against what?", Military Review, January, 1974, pp. 3-12.

many things and our resources in most cases are seldom sufficient to permit guarding against every enemy capability. The commander must therefore accept certain risks. Clearly, these risks are less dangerous if the commander can determine which of the many capabilities the enemy is actually going to adopt. This is rarely possible to predict with certainty; but the skillful intelligence officer, by an analysis of clues, can determine which capability the enemy is most likely to adopt, and thereby provide the commander with a basis for weighing his risks... This reasoning /based on thorough knowledge of the enemy's recent performance, tactical doctrine, national psychology, or the character and attitude of the hostile commander/_ is particularly applicable at higher levels; but it is far better to base the deduction on cold, hard facts about the enemy's activities. These cold, hard facts do not lead to an attempt to guess the enemy's intentions, for intention is a frame of mind, and can change at will.²⁶

Robert William's view is in substantial agreement, if less succinctly expressed:

Your ultimate intelligence goal should always be to determine your opponent's. This may surprise you, for we have historically shied away from dealing with intentions and have stuck to enemy capabilities. But we continue to be surprised. Clearly, our present approach is not working, one major reason it is not is because we tend to think of intentions in terms of what we believe the enemy will do rather than in terms of what he says he intends to... Of course, you will rarely have a complete statement of intent by your opponent--you might have to work with much less--but the opportunities for acquiring such information are increasing as the world shrinks and as intelligence techniques improve. If you do not acquire statements from the enemy about what he intends to do (his plan), then do not consider that you dealing with intentions ... How are statements of intent by an enemy collected? The ways and means vary from the most sophisticated espionage operations all the way down the scale to the extraction of information from unclassified publications.²⁷

²⁶Glass, p. 59.

²⁷ Robert W. Williams, "Surprise: The Danger Signals," Army, April, 1974, pp. 10-16.

Kent, too, takes a very pessimistic view of intention as a collection objective, unrelieved by Williams faith in the "statement of intent":

Does [General Orlov, one time Soviet intelligence officer] really believe that on any subject he wants to name there is a single document or group of documents which contains the desired secret? Does he really believe that the spy could know enough about such a treasure to look for it in the right place? Does he really believe that some spy or other could secure access to the right place or could recognize the document if he saw it? ... There is no question that General Orlov's successors in the Soviet secret intelligence organization have directed the lifting of a great many secret documents. But when they had them in hand, what then: Did every document proclaim on its face: "I am not the off-beat thoughts and recommendations of a highly-placed but erratic advisor; I am not a draft from high quarters intended solely as a basis for discussion...".²⁸

The Ability to See into the Future

Opinion on this subject was found to both scanty and mixed. Gilbert Highet notes that, "a responsible intelligence officer must plan stratagems which may take years to mature..."²⁹; and Ransom, agreeing, says that, "the importance of projecting long-range intelligence requirements cannot be overestimated."³⁰

²⁸Kent, p. xxiii.

²⁹Gilbert Highet, untitled review of John Le Carre /David Cornwell/, Tinker, Tailor, Soldier, Spy, Book-of-the-Month Club prospectus, April, 1974.

³⁰Ransom, p. 43.

On the other hand, Arthur Clarke, in Toffler's volume, cites spectacular failures in the past of technological forecasting³¹; and Williams wisely cautions against being swept along by the "prevailing climate of opinion."³² Willmoore Kendall scores Kent, as a reflection of the contemporary (1949) intelligence community, for being preoccupied with prediction.³³

Summary

First, a general word of caution about the sources is in order. Almost without exception the authors were writing before the technological revolution (space, electronic, and computation) in intelligence collection got under way about 15 years ago. Several, in fact, predate the Central Intelligence Agency as we know it today. Finally, it should be noted that, based on admittedly scanty information it appears that none but the pseudonymous "Christopher Felix" have had significant operational involvement in controlled Humint collection operations. Most had gained their experience in intelligence production, rather than collection.

³¹Arthur C. Clarke, "Hazards of Prophecy", The Futurists, (ed. Alvin Toffler;) (New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 133-150.

³²Williams, p. 12

³³See Note 14, this Appendix. Kendall, p. 549.

Hilsman describes in elaborate detail a concept for analysis by a non-departmental intelligence agency of national objectives to determine intelligence tasks, followed by active involvement in policy decisions. He rejects this scheme in favor of departmental direction of the effort, excepting a freer but undefined role for specialized collection activities.

There is general agreement on the need for effective communication between the collector and the consumer, but no specific concepts on how this should be achieved, other than the EEI concept of Glass and Davidson.

Impassioned discussion on the subject of intentions, a characteristic objective of controlled Humint, was found. While almost all considered it to be an objective of value, many were very skeptical as to its attainability. The same spectrum of opinion was found with regard to the desirability, utility, and feasibility of long-range forecasting, although it was necessary to extrapolate views expressed in a substantive context (intelligence estimates) to an operational context (collection tasking).

APPENDIX C

ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES IN REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA

SOVIET UNION

United States policy objectives with respect to the Soviet Union, found in United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping a Durable Peace (USFP IV), appeared to fall into two categories, or perhaps more accurately, to be capable of being viewed in two aspects: building a new relationship; and assuring the national security. Obviously, the two are intimately connected and it can be argued either that the new relationship is sought in order to ensure our security, or that a favorable security posture is sought to permit the building of a new relationship. Whatever the case -- and both arguments are probably valid -- each "aspect" is useful in providing a focus for different kinds of policy objectives.

To Build a New Relationship

In reviewing his perspective at the outset of his Administration, President Nixon says that he realized that, "although we competed, our conflict did not admit of resolution by victory in the classical sense. We seemed compelled to coexist. We had an inescapable joint obligation to build a structure for peace. Recognition of this reality has been the keystone of United States policy since 1969." (p. 36)

Therefore, the goal was "set forth at the beginning of this Administration: to effect a basic change in our relations with the Soviet Union in the interest of a stable world peace from which all countries would benefit." (p.26)* It was believed that, not only the need, but the conditions existed to embark on this course: (1) "divisions within the Communist world had deepened;" (2) this coincided with a revival of Europe and Japan, "reinforcing the trend toward multi-polarity;" and (3) the fact of rough parity itself made the moment propitious. (p. 26) These perceptions, and apparently corresponding or complementary ones in the Kremlin, led eventually to the historic week of 22-29 May 1972 in Moscow, where "we concentrated on those specific issues where it was possible to make immediate progress so that agreements would contribute to a broader improvement of relations. We looked for areas where we could strengthen the principle of mutual restraint. We decided that progress should not be tied solely to the state of technical or procedural discussions but should take into account the political relationships... that would ultimately determine the success or failure of the agreements." (p. 196) In his

*Throughout this Appendix, parenthetical references are to pages in United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's: Shaping Durable Peace (USFP IV).

assessment of the Moscow Summit, President Nixon reflects satisfaction, optimism and caution: "Progress in one area reinforced progress in others... Future areas of cooperation and negotiation were opened up. There has been, in sum, major movement toward a steadier and more constructive relationship. On the other hand, areas of tension and potential conflict remain, and certain patterns of Soviet behavior continue to cause concern." (p. 11) The hope is expressed that "direct contact, exchanges of information and experience, and joint participation in specific projects will develop a fabric of relationships supplementing those at the higher levels of political leadership." (p. 33)

De-ideologization. This striking and requisite feature of the drive to build a new relationship ("a new relationship would require new attitudes and aspirations" (p. 37) is reflected in the "general principle," governing Soviet-American relationships, which was agreed to by both parties in Moscow: "Relations will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting... mutual relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the United States and the Soviet Union are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs,

and mutual advantage." (p. 37)

A new economic relationship. The considerable effort expended on trade agreements at (and prior to) the Moscow Summit appears to have had a dual objective: to form a part of the warp and woof of the new relationship; and to gain more immediate, purely economic advantages by exploiting the complementarity of the Soviet and American economies. (p.38) Of these two, the former was considered to have priority. (p. 33) After describing the trade agreements in his Report (p. 34), President Nixon goes on to assert that, "these agreements open the way not only for a prompt invigoration of trade but also for developing these relations into a permanent component of the overall relationship projected at the summit. It is not a question of whether certain elements should be separable, or conditional, but whether we wish the entire process of a broadly based new relationship with the Soviet Union to unfold." (p. 35) But, further, "the Soviet Union has vast natural resources, such as natural gas, that can be developed with the help of American capital and technology. These resources would then be available for export to the United States, thus enabling the Soviet Union to repay our credits and pay for imports from the United States ... such ventures... establish an interdependence between our economies which provides a continuing incentive to maintain a constructive relationship." (p. 35)

Ensuring Security

President Nixon states (p. 13) that there are two paths to national security: arms control and a strong defense; that SALT was a milestone, but tasks remain, viz. extension of arms limitation agreements (eventually to reduction), and force reductions (MBFR); that our defense is both "sufficient" and "all-volunteer", but that "changing times and surging costs" cause a search for new "doctrines and deployments." Four sub-objectives (or sub-aspects) of the security objective were discerned: survival, reduced cost, reassurance of allies, restraint of the growth of Soviet influence. In addition, an "exemplary" sub-objective concerning Eastern Europe was identified and will be discussed in the greater European context.

Survival. We need to be strong, but must realize that too great strength could be counter-productive through encouraging a Soviet buildup (p. 185), thus, in 1972, "we tried to create circumstances that would offer the Soviet leaders an opportunity to move away from confrontation through carefully prepared negotiations." (p. 28) On the other hand, "we dealt with... contradictory manifestations by responding to positive efforts and demonstrating firmness in the face of pressures" and "sought to demonstrate the wisdom of restraint..." (p. 29) As to the future, a need was recognized to respect each other's security requirements and to be willing to balance each other's

legitimate interests. (p. 38)

Reduced costs. Not surprisingly, reduction of costs is less salient in addressing the Soviet threat, than it was in a broader context. Nevertheless, expense is an unstated component of the thrust toward force reduction in Europe, in regard to which the argument is made that we must not "protect national interest by procedural devices or tactical solutions... Our goal must be agreement on basic security principles." (p. 90) However, since the United States and Soviet forces are not indigenous to Central and western Europe, they are the most obvious candidates for reduction. (p. 91)

Reassurance of allies. President Nixon acknowledges concern among allies, especially NATO partners, that we will "pursue a new balance of power" (p. 92), but asserts that we "will never compromise the security of Europe or the interests of our allies" (p. 93); and again, "negotiation with adversaries does not alter our more fundamental ties with friends." (p. 233) "The security of western Europe is inseparable from our own" (p. 84) and, if there is doubt as to a continuing presence, "the conditions of this decade require the United States to maintain substantial forces in Europe. In conditions of near strategic parity, a strong capability to defend with non-nuclear forces becomes increasingly important..." (p. 84) The relationship, however, will not be entirely as it was in

the past. Among other things, President Nixon proposed to move from strictly bilateral talks with Soviets to multi-lateral talks including the Europeans (p. 38), as has, in fact, happened. Or, to relate this to a purported keystone of the "Nixon Doctrine", "we intend to share responsibilities, not abdicate them." (p. 233)

Eastern Europe. Curiously subsumed under the section "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance" in USFP IV is what has been referred to as an "exemplary" objective. President Nixon says that our relations with Eastern Europe countries are not related to our relationship with Moscow, because we reject the idea of spheres of influence; that we want to construct a wide range of relationships with them. (p. 91) As in the case of the Soviet Union, he says that "differences in social, economic, and political systems exist... But they will not bar our cooperation with any country that seeks it." (p. 92) In light of the similarities of both language and content to the rationale for direct negotiation with the Soviets, and regardless of incidental economic advantages which would accrue, the driving reason behind the Eastern Europe policy appears to be to maintain consistency with and to demonstrate our approach to the Soviets.

Restrain growth of Soviet influence. This is a fundamental argument for the maintenance of security forces: "We want a greater degree of stability, in which neither side

an advantage because of lower force levels" (p.86), for we simply cannot risk "greatly enhanced Soviet influence".

(p. 84) "It is unlikely that the Europeans alone could maintain a strategic balance against the enormous nuclear power of the Soviet Union." (p. 84) Further, although the Soviet threat in Asia and Europe will continue to be primary, we cannot ignore Soviet naval presence in the Caribbean or Mediterranean Seas, the Indian Ocean, or along the coasts of Africa; "security commitments, support facilities, and communications networks in key areas of the Third World; or increasing Soviet arms programs in these areas." (p. 187) An implication drawn is that, in light of nuclear parity, increased reliance must be placed on strong general purpose forces. (p. 186)

INDIA

United States policy objectives with respect to India found in USFP IV were seen to be of three basic kinds--political, idealistic, and economic--with the first-named dominating the discussion by a wide margin. They were seen to be shaped by the rapprochement with China ("Peace could not exclude a fourth of humanity" (p. 7)); by general domestic pressures in America for withdrawal from foreign involvements (p. 5,6); possibly by a tendency to view Eurasia from an

"off-shore" or "littoral" viewpoint; and, possibly, by pique. The penultimate point may be reflected in the fact that "Asia and the Pacific" are discussed together in Part III of USFP IV, entitled "Strengthening Partnerships", while South Asia is discussed in Part IV, "Regions of Tension and Opportunity", as if, when turning the corner of the Malacca Straits, one were to forget that there is a back door connecting where you have come from, with where you are going. The role of pique will be discussed at greater length below. The effect of China on our Indian policy was multiplied by what was perceived as a special relationship with the former of long standing ("... historic concern...traditional friendship..." (p. 24)). The 1971 war on the subcontinent was perceived as detrimental in every aspect to United States interests.

Political Objectives.

"The American interest in South Asia is clear-cut: we want the region to be a contributor to global peace, not a threat to it. We want the region to be an example to the world of peaceful progress." (p. 143) Fortunately, the policy analyst is not forced to deduce United States policy objectives from this statement alone. Upon further examination, it appears that, in general terms, our political objectives in South Asia are maintenance of the status quo and a regional balance of power.

"The United States has no economic or strategic interest in a privileged position, nor in forming ties directed against any country inside the region or outside the region, nor in altering the basic political framework on the subcontinent. We have an interest in seeing that no other power attempts this either--and we believe the best insurance against this is a stable regional system founded on the secure independence of each nation in it." (p. 143)

"...United States policies globally and regionally, will support the independence of South Asian nations." (p. 151)

Moreover, in spite of pique and the famous "tilt" toward Pakistan in the 1971 war,

"Our dialogue has now begun ... Ambassador Moynihan's cordial reception in India was a sign that the passage of time and constructive attitudes on both sides have laid a foundation for a serious improvement in our relations. The recent discussions which Deputy Secretary of State Rush had in New Delhi on his trip to South Asia confirmed this." (p. 149)

Prevention of dominance by a single regional power.

This theme dominates the discussion of South Asia, at least from the standpoint of reiteration and volume. The traumatic event, of course, was the 1971 war which resulted in Indian hegemony on the subcontinent, a fact alluded to in USFP IV:

"India emerged from the 1971 crisis with new confidence, power, and responsibilities. This fact in itself was a new political reality for the subcontinent and for all nations concerned with South Asia's future. For the nations of that region, the question was how India would use its power. For the nations outside the region, the question was what the relationship of this power would be to that of other powers in the world.

"Because India is a major country, her actions on the world stage necessarily affect us and our interests." (p. 47)

However,

"Every country on the subcontinent has a basic right to determine its own destiny without interference or dominance by any other. The United States places a high value on this right, out of conviction and out of interest in a peaceful regional system. Every major power--now including India, with its new power in the region--has a basic responsibility toward the international system to exercise its power with restraint, so that these smaller nations may look to the future confident of their security and independence." (p. 150)

The Administration views the 1971 war, not as an adjustment of political forms to political facts, but as a dangerously destabilizing event:

"In 1971 the breakdown of peace in South Asia not only brought war and suffering to the millions of people directly affected. It raised concern about stability for the whole region from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia. It involved the great powers in a potentially dangerous confrontation whose significance went far beyond the immediate South Asian conflict.

"Today we can hope that the subcontinent has found a new foundation for stability. This will depend first and foremost on the normalization of relations between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh ... it means consolidating a new stability on the subcontinent: an end to the arms race; an end to territorial disputes; expanded economic cooperation; and creation of a climate of security and, ultimately, reconciliation." (p. 144)

"Encouragement of turmoil within nations on the subcontinent can bring not only the devastation of civil and international war, but the involvement of outside powers". (p. 145)

In implementation of this view:

"As a general matter, reconciliation on the subcontinent is not a process the United States can directly affect, except to give encouragement and support to constructive actions." (pp. 144,145)

"Our policy now, as before 1971, is to permit the export of non-lethal equipment and of spare parts for equipment previously supplied by the United States. There is no change in our purpose. We are not participating in an arms race in the sub-continent." (p. 146)

Exclusion of great power influence. The second great theme sounded is the prevention of significant involvement in the South Asia-Indian Ocean area of the PRC and the Soviet Union, particularly the latter. As a general position:

"India's relationships with the major powers are for it to decide, and we have no interest in inhibiting their growth. However, we have a natural concern that India not be locked into exclusive ties with major countries directed against us or other countries with whom we have relationships which we value." (p. 147)

The problem of the PRC is rather easily handled by reporting that, in the course of the summit meeting with Chinese leaders, it was agreed that, "neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region [which, as we see from the organization of USFP IV, may not even include South Asia] and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony ..." (p. 20) The Soviet Union, however, was obviously a cause for more concern. Although the Moscow Summit had been agreed to in October 1971, prior to the war (p. 31),

"tension arose from the crisis in the Indian subcontinent for a period in late 1971. Indian regular forces first entered East Bengal on 2 December. Such developments gave us grounds for serious concern, and we reacted vigorously."

(p. 29) In reporting on the results of the Moscow Summit, President Nixon states that, "What we have agreed upon is not ... a condominium of the two strongest powers, or a division of spheres of influence." (p. 137) Nevertheless, doubts remained, for in discussing "Defense Policy" (p. 178 ff), he says that,

"We also need forces to deal with lesser contingencies that pose a threat to our interest--a capability not necessarily provided by units positioned for a major conflict overseas." (p. 187)

And in "Agenda for the Future" (p. 150 ff), he concludes that

"The relations between the countries of South Asia and countries outside the region must be consistent with the peace and independence of the subcontinent and the peace of the world. If any outside power acquires an exclusive position in an area of this mass and potential, others will be forced to respond. The major powers all have important relationships there. No South Asian interest is served if those relationships are embroiled in local tensions." (p. 151)

Alliances. Our alliances should not be construed as threatening--"negotiation with adversaries does not alter our more fundamental ties with friends although it is not clear that India is considered among the latter"--and great pains are taken to specifically reassure India as regards our new

relationship with China:

"The United States will not join in any groupings or pursue any policies directed against India. Our normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is not directed against India or inconsistent with our desire to enjoy good relations with India. The United States and China declared in the Shanghai Communiqué that we both saw attempts at collusion, hegemony, or spheres of interest as inconsistent with peace in Asia. I believe that on this principle a constructive pattern of relations is possible among all the major countries of Asia, and this is the objective of United States policy." (p. 148)

On the other hand, India is warned that her "policy toward her neighbors on the subcontinent and other countries in nearby parts of Asia is now an important determinant of regional stability, which is of interest to us." (p. 148)

Idealistic Objectives

The humanitarian concern which has been a characteristic of American foreign policy for at least 60 years is not lacking:

"Despite a record of significant accomplishment--including an average annual increase in economic growth of more than 5.5 percent in the last decade, the success of the Green Revolution, and rapid advances in health and education--hundreds of millions of people in the developing countries still exist in conditions of extreme hunger, poverty, and disease. Basic humanitarian considerations call on us to assist these countries in improving the lives of their people." (p. 172)

And, in looking ahead (Agenda for the Future):

"... the United States will contribute, where asked and where possible, to meeting human needs and to

the process of development. We do this out of traditional humanitarian concern of the American people, and out of a common interest in supporting the effectiveness and stability of institutions." (p. 151)

Economic Objectives

Finally, a limited number of economic objectives are seen, related in one instance to the development-stability-security aspect of the Nixon Doctrine:

"Many of these /developing nations/ have energy resources and raw materials that we will need in significantly increasing amounts. Some of them have become fast-growing markets for our exports." (p. 172)

However,

"Unless substantial progress occurs--through efforts by developed and developing nations alike--the stability of many countries and regions can be jeopardized as essential needs of people go unsatisfied." (p. 172)

Therefore:

"Both the United States and India are interested in defining a new basis for a mature economic relationship between us over the longer term... For the future, both sides are now interested in how to move toward Indian self-reliance." (p. 148)

APPENDIX D

FORECAST THEMES IN REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA

INTRODUCTION

What follows is a description of some prominent themes encountered in the work of forecasters and other writers which are suggestive of threats and aids to the attainment of United States objectives with regard to Soviet Union and India. Because of its selectivity, the Hudson Institute is called on to lend more balance, by including some "Perspectives" on each of the two countries.¹

THE SOVIET UNION

Outlook for the Soviet system

Ideological petrefaction and irrelevance: Frequent note was taken of the moral difference between the post-revolutionary Soviet Union and the post-Stalin Soviet Union. Brzezinski makes reference to the "bureaucratization of boredom," and "ideological petrefaction" in describing the loss of revolutionary elan and sees the possibility of Russia

¹Hudson Institute, Alternative 1975-85 Political and Strategic Environments for Military Planners: A Contextual Overview with Thematic Charts (Croton-on-Hudson, New York: Hudson Institute, 1969).

becoming simply "another spent, post-imperial power."² Externally, he foresees her decline as a socio-economic model for contemporary Communism.³ Indeed, Vernon D. Aspaturian perceives a decline of "messianic" foreign policies on the part of both of the superpowers, inasmuch as neither has succeeded imposing its vision--believes, in fact, that both are undergoing a crisis of identity.⁴ The Hudson Institute offers the argument that this is a deliberate development, now institutionally safeguarded, and, hence, unlikely to change in the foreseeable (1975-85) future.⁵

Economic/technical needs: Serious (in terms of her power relative to the United States), if not fatal, economic problems are foreseen for the Soviet Union. Toffler, in fact, relates them to similar problems in the whole industrialized world: "What we are witnessing is the beginning of the final breakup of industrialism and, with it, the collapse of technocratic planning."⁶

²Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking Press, 1970), p. 138.

³Brzezinski, p. 175.

⁴Vernon D. Aspaturian, "The USSR, the USA and China in the Seventies," Military Review, January, 1974, pp. 51,52.

⁵Hudson, p. 9.

⁶Alvin Toffler (ed.). "The Strategy of Social Futurism," The Futurist (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 98.

The Hudson Institute, however, tends to see in this a relative disadvantage for the Soviets: "Significant demographic differences will have been removed between the two superpowers but substantial advantage in terms of GNP will accrue to the United States..." in the last two decades of this century.⁷ Further, in surveying the multinational corporation phenomenon, Bowen foresees a possible advantage for the West in the irresistible economic attraction of allowing economic penetration of the Socialist systems, as well as serious ideological problems for the latter as trade grows. He is confident, moreover, that we would be dominant in this intercourse, and that our continued technological lead is assured.⁸ Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs can even visualize Japan overtaking the Soviet Union in economic terms.⁹ Tyrus W. Cobb, in fact, ascribes to the Soviet Union's growing (relatively) economic deficiencies the principal impetus for the present detente, citing her need for Western help in the form of

⁷Hudson, p. 18.

⁸Richard A. Bowen, "Multinational Corporations," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, January, 1973, pp. 59,61.

⁹Herman Kahn and B. Bruce-Briggs, Things to Come: Thinking about the Seventies and Eighties (New York: MacMillan, 1972), p. 38.

products, credits, and technology to "bail out" her agriculture and manufacturing and, especially to help in rationalizing her central planning.¹⁰

Fear and rigidity: Her economic need for the West is seen as driving the Soviet Union into the paradoxical situation of seeking closer ties with the Western states while denouncing them the more loudly.¹¹ This occasions, for example, the spectacle of her intellectuals shrilly denouncing the deduction-based forecasting common the West. Brzezinski has noted the dearth of forecasting except in narrowly circumscribed technological areas, accompanied by a growing intensity of ideologizing as a framework for action.¹² I. Bestuzhev-Lada lends credence to this in his essay in the collection edited by Toffler, The Futurists.¹³ Aspaturian takes a somewhat more optimistic view in noting that, while the Soviet Union cannot afford the importation of ideas, she will permit access to assist the functioning of the system, that "system parity" may, in fact, provide a better basis for stability than does nuclear parity.¹⁴

¹⁰Tyrus W. Cobb, "The Durability of Detente", Military Review, April, 1974, pp. 4,5.

¹¹Cobb, p. 6, ¹²Brzezinski, p. 138ff.

¹³I. Bestuzhev-Lada, "Bourgeois 'Futurology' and the Future of Mankind", The Futurists (ed. Alvin Toffler; New York: Random House, 1972), pp.194-210.

¹⁴Aspaturian, p. 63.

Danger to the United States remains, however, as illustrated by Henry A. Kissinger's observation that increased control over a domestic environment may be purchased at the cost of flexibility in foreign affairs.¹⁵

The "generational succession": Aspaturian describes at length, in actuarial terms, the timing and scope of the succession crisis to come. He suggests that "the actuarial tables will dictate the death of relatively large numbers of key people within a brief span of years, and create a vast vacuum at the top... The nature and direction of this generational succession crisis can, in its turn, trigger widespread social turbulence..."; and observes that, "succession crises in major states, whether generational or not, constitutional or not, will always leave their imprint on the direction and definition of foreign policy goals."¹⁶ Brezezinski sees several alternative ways for the Russians to deal with this problem and the pressures described above, in the mid-and long-range periods: oligarchic petrefaction, pluralist evolution, technological adaption, militant fundamentalism, political disintegration. He believes that, through the 1970's, the leadership may opt for a balance between oligarchic petrefaction and technological adaptation, and that,

¹⁵Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 18.

¹⁶Aspaturian, p. 61.

in the 1980's, the new leadership may shift to a combination of pluralist evolution and technological adaption.¹⁷ Mr. Kissinger is called upon again to put these developments in a national security perspective: Since deterrence is in the mind, the effect of the domestic environment on perceptions and values is crucial.¹⁸

Soviet Strategic Requirements

There seems no unanimity on what the Soviet Union's base course will be in years to come, even when viewed on the grandest scale. While Aspaturian believes that "the slow abdication of the United States from the apex of the system will probably proceed smoothly in that Moscow and Peking will attempt to check each other's ambition to rise to the top,"¹⁹ Hanson W. Baldwin warns that, as in Mackindor's day, the heartland is still threatening the rimlands (including North America).²⁰

China: Morton H. Halperin believes that there can no longer be any doubt that the Soviet leadership views China

¹⁷Brzezinski, pp. 164-174. ¹⁸Kissinger, pp. 15.

¹⁹Aspaturian, p. 55.

²⁰Hanson W. Baldwin, Strategy for Tomorrow (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), p. 300.

as a potential military opponent.²¹ Cobb sees the quarrel as being so comprehensive that it has begun to take on some of the features of Cold War, e.g. "containment," and has created the anachronism of PRC support of NATO. Nevertheless he ascribes second place to the quarrel with China among the reasons for détente. (First place is given to the need for Western economic assistance).²² Racial overtones to the quarrel have been hinted at now and again. Certainly it will be shaped to some degree by the ethnocentricity so characteristic of the Chinese. Brzezinski, in fact, sees a general trend toward more race- and nationality-based Communist movements.²³ The quarrel with China must also, of course shape Soviet attitudes and actions toward South and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean, which constitute an open flank to each side.

Europe: Halperin summarizes Soviet strategic objectives in Europe since World War II as follows: "... to consolidate control over Eastern Europe, to gain control over, or at least neutralize Germany, and to drive the United States from Europe."²⁴ He also notes that "the Soviet posture toward Western Europe

²¹ Morton H. Halperin. Defense Strategies for the Seventies (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), p. 62.

²² Cobb, pp. 4,13,14. ²³ Brzezinski, p.181ff. ²⁴ Halperin, p. 61.

has been and continues to be, a defensive and deterrent one; that they "never even contemplated the overt use of military force against Western Europe"; but that a "key element" of Soviet strategy has been "the notion that Western Europe can be used to deter the United States from attacking the Soviet Union."²⁵ Joseph F. Santilli, Jr. agrees that a massive Soviet attack on Western Europe is inconceivable, but notes that military blackmail for lesser objectives is an alternative.²⁶ As regards constraints, Brzezinski foresees some instability in Eastern Europe, in company with increasingly diversified communism.²⁷

United States: This writer accepts, at least for the purposes of this paper, Halperin's contention that, with respect to the United States, the Soviet goal is nuclear parity, not superiority. They also appear to be determined not to allow the marked United States superiority which existed in the 1960's, and would "race" to prevent its recurrence. The Soviet doctrine also emphasizes the critical importance of surprise and of the first strike, and the importance of command and control, for internal political reasons among others.²⁸

²⁵ Halperin, pp. 59,60.

²⁶ Joseph F. Santilli, Jr., "NATO Strategy Updated: A First Use Policy," Military Review, March, 1974, pp. 4-6.

²⁷ Brzezinski, pp. 181,189. ²⁸ Halperin, pp. 58,59.

Anopos the arms race, Thomas C. Shelling observes that, "the longer the run considered, the more the arms race takes on the character of a two-sided adaptive system, rather than a pair of unilateral programs."²⁹ Cobb shares this view of the role of action and reaction, believing that the Kremlin has no "master plan" for detente, but that its future course will be based as much on our actions as on theirs.³⁰

The prospects of general and complete disarmament, as contrasted with arms control, are significantly reduced by the American insistence on mechanisms for enforcement and arbitration, for this would require a political decision-making institution, which the UN does not provide, and which is not apt to exist in the foreseeable future.³¹ Brzezinski, as usual, sees matters through a somewhat different lens. He sees the United States-Soviet rivalry becoming less intensive but more extensive.³² Some of the

²⁹ Thomas C. Shelling, "Managing the Arms Race," Problems of National Strategy (ed. Henry A. Kissinger; New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 375.

³⁰ Cobb, p. 15.

³¹ Laurence W. Martin, "Peaceful Settlement and Peaceful Change," A Disarmed World: A Study of the United States Outline for General and Complete Disarmament (Arnold Wolfers et al.; Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 91ff.

³² Brzezinski, p. 282.

policy implications he lists are as follows: "a posture based on ideological considerations has become dated; an American-Soviet axis is not likely to be the basis for a new international system; traditional spheres of influence are increasingly unviable; economic determinism in regard to the less developed countries or to the communist states does not provide a sound basis for policy; regional alliances against individual nations are becoming obsolescent..."³³

Three "Perspectives"

What follows are three viewpoints of the Soviet Union in the period 1975-1985. They are taken from the "Contextual Overview with Thematic Charts" of the Alternative 1975-85 Political and Strategic Environments for Military Planners prepared by the Hudson Institute in 1969. They represent three ways in which different Americans, with representative viewpoints labelled "Prudential Internationalist," "Austere Pragmatic Interventionist," and "Aggressive Democrat"³⁴, might view the Russia which is expected to develop by that time. They are a way of conveying the shape of what is foreseen, without commitment to a particular interpretation of that shape. They also convey a range of opinions, while keeping

³³Brzezinski, p. 285.

³⁴Defined in Things to Come as well as in the "Overview".

in sight the relationship between those opinions. There is much in each of them which is threatening and cheering.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUNIST POWER

1. Powerful in absolute terms--and currently rapidly improving a broad spectrum of military capabilities.
2. Record and tradition of relative prudence in dangerous foreign adventures. It seems, despite its huge historic expansion, ultimately defensive in mind and temper.
3. Foreign policy a success in securing Russia's defenses, influence; a failure in ideological proselytizing and expansion.
4. Yet very powerful, very talented society, patient and enduring.
5. And committed to rivalry with the United States by both ideology and the dynamics of our geopolitical relationship.
6. Dramatic challenges in international communist movement (China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Rumania) and only two converts to communism since 1950 (Cuba and North Vietnam--some would also include Tibet, Zanzibar, parts of Laos and South Vietnam).
7. Repeatedly humiliated (China, Cuba, Congo, Romania, Arab-Israeli war, bombing of North Vietnam, etc.). Cuba dissident; Congo wholly lost; U.S.S.R. may be setting up risk of new fiasco in Middle East.
8. Losing enthusiasm and perhaps imperial nerve.
9. Expansion of economy relatively slow. Economy itself comparatively resistant to reform. Very little actual evidence of such reformability, or of its likely permanence even if achieved. Economic malformations have been incorporated into ideology.

10. Agriculture inefficient. New crises likely to emerge.
11. Increasingly consumer-oriented.
12. Increasing signs of an existing and growing intellectual dissidence--though the Czech occupation may dampen this.
13. Accomodating to revisionist trends in industry, agriculture, national planning, scientific truth, etc. within the bloc; while suppressing similar trends in internal politics and culture and strengthening internal discipline generally.
14. Increasingly internal stress is strongly reminiscent of latter-day Czarist Russia: Restless intelligentsia vs. unimaginative bureaucrats and reactionary service police.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AUSTERE PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONIST

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUNIST POWER

1. In spite of apparent absolute power, cautious in confrontations with West, often inept in diplomacy and military planning, and with many other weaknesses.
2. There are no cases of "volunteerist satellites". Czechoslovak invasion emphasizes Russia as European rather than communist power.
3. Communist apparatchiki almost exactly wrong personnel-types to manage flourishing consumer economy.
4. Agricultural yields still very low by standards of developed countries.
5. Present army wholly untested (except selected equipment).
6. The dynamics of internal intellectual dissidence clearly include possibilities for both an

escalation of dissidence and a massive repression.

7. Recent Soviet ventures seem relatively opportunistic and ill-advised.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AGGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT

U.S.S.R. - STILL THE LEADING COMMUNIST POWER

1. May have greater weapons competency than many Western strategic analysts are willing to grant. It may not be irrelevant to note that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia occurred at a time when the Soviets were achieving nuclear parity with the United States.
2. The new pluralism in communism may make the movement more attractive to join while not necessarily weakening its strength greatly--at least for some issues. Moreover, this pluralism may decline with Czech invasion and Soviets **do** care about unity and discipline a lot.
3. Current reforms and innovations may still make a big difference in the economic structure in spite of bad management.
4. Is becoming increasingly efficient in agriculture --may learn much from past failures.
5. Seems to be doing a much better "professional" and "technical" job on central war forces. Naval expansion considerable, particularly in the submarine fleet.
6. Dissidence from intellectuals seems to be declining recently. Lack of university protest of Czechoslovak invasion.
7. Is not losing enthusiasm and imperial nerve as much as the "realist" and neo-isolationist West. America may have been more interventionist and **bold** in the fifties than the U.S.S.R.--at least in the

non-communist world and especially when we were asked--but recently we seem both passive and the prisoner of events, while the Soviets seem relatively aggressive and expansive.

3. Seems to be able to salvage a good deal out of many of their apparent "fiascos"--for example, in Middle East and Mediterranean. So far the Soviet Union has come out of the Czechoslovak crisis very well, while Western Europe seems extremely concerned by the American response. It is to be noted that Cuba, although terming the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia illegal, gave the Soviet Union its support.
9. While military emphasis has been on defense in past, now equipping itself with fleet and intervention forces on the American model; deliberately breaking with the "land animal" tradition to fulfill a new self-image as world power; making disturbing threats against West Germany and Rumania.
10. Deeply disturbed by foreign policy and domestic implications of Czechoslovak liberalization, West European C.P. revisionism, East Germany's isolation, U.S.S.R. could begin to tighten control or contact all around.
11. Party has resources of repression, internal discipline, unavailable to Czars. And no serious fundamental intellectual challenge to Marxism-Leninism. It may not be possible now in this society to reimpose Stalinist discipline but it probably is unnecessary. Today the communist bloc is faced only by a West which appears to be losing resolve at a much faster pace than the communist world.
12. The Czech crisis and lack of new proselytes reflects a divergence between communist interest and national interests of the satellites which may be increasingly exploitable by United States.
13. If the Soviet Union acquires a not incredible first-strike capability against the United States, as it well might, and if NATO continues to disintegrate, the Soviet Union may acquire a momentum

that leads to a major change in world balance of power and that increases Soviet aggressiveness enormously.

INDIA

The review of relevant forecasts regarding India is divided into four major parts. The first concerns her status as a power--in absolute terms, regionally, and in relation to the great powers. The second concerns the particular problem of the Indian Ocean. The third examines her prospects (or desires) in regard to military hardware, focusing on the key question of whether she will exercise her nuclear option.³⁵ Finally, as in the previous section this section is closed by reproducing some viewpoints developed by the Hudson Institute.

Power status

In his "personal view" of the oncoming "Technetronic Age", Brzezinski makes an observation which is of interest in trying to place India's movement in perspective. He says that objective and subjective changes in the developing countries are not co-variant, and the result is contradictory trends: toward global fragmentation; and toward unification. The stratification of development results first in a new nationalism,

³⁵India detonated a nuclear device underground on 18 May 1974.

then in a regional, and finally a global consciousness.³⁶ Articulate Indians appear to see themselves somewhere in the second of these three phases. M. S. Iyengar goes so far as to describe some means by which India could move to post-industrial status without working through every aspect of industrialization, learning from the "maldevelopments" of the West.³⁷ But her present problems are serious enough to dampen the most enthusiastic predictions of future greatness. Describing the disastrous effects of the current drought on both agriculture and industry, Time magazine notes that even if with rain, the problem is not solved, because "the architects of India's five-year plans have encouraged an unbalanced industrial development; in the past five years, demand for electricity grew by 7%, but generating capacity increased only 3%."³⁸

Maharaj K. Chopra gives us an overview of the evolution of independent India's strategic environment, dividing it into three phases: The first phase, 1947-1960, saw "internal consolidation, concern with the borderlands, suspicions about

³⁵ Brzezinski, pp. 35-52.

³⁷ M. S. Iyengar, "Can We Transform into a Post-industrial Society?" The Futurists (ed. Alvin Toffler; New York: Random House, 1972), pp. 190-193.

³⁸ "A Crippling Shortage", Time, 29 April, 1974, p. 56.

China, hostility with Pakistan and a sense of security against a major external threat..." The second phase, 1960-1970, saw war with China and Pakistan, a widening of India's security horizons, and a realization that strict non-alignment was no longer possible. In the present phase, neither Pakistan nor the East Bengal area (now Bangladesh) present threats; China's growing might--and New Delhi's special relationship with Moscow--make China a powerful influence from Southeast Asia to East Africa.³⁹ In calls for future action, K. Brahma Singh speaks of "wresting the initiative" from the PRC and Pakistan in conducting "indirect war", of aiding any country in the region which suffers Chinese or Pakistani aggression, and of forming pacts--although he considers that with the Soviet Union too lop-sided.⁴⁰ L. L. Sondhi believes that India must "show skill" in managing the Indo-Soviet relationship--"the convergence of Soviet and Indian interests in opposition to the parallelism of United States and Chinese attitudes"; explain her course to the United States; work toward detente with China; be careful in dealings with Japan; and reassuring toward Southeast Asia. He concludes that, "the fundamental problem facing a nuclear [sic below] India is to develop its

³⁹ Maharaj K. Chopra, "India's Strategic Environment", Military Review, June, 1970, pp. 27-32.

⁴⁰ K. Brahma Singh, "India and the Balance of Power", Military Review, April, 1974, p. 45.

fruitful realism of 1971 into a purposeful acceptance of the obligations of power and give up ideas of fixed hostility to Peking and Islamabad..."⁴¹

Regional hegemony: There is no question in Indian minds that regional hegemony already exists, and it is theirs. "With the breakup of Pakistan, India emerges as South Asia's foremost power and now visualizes a larger of sphere of security for itself."⁴² Sondhi sees a "manifest destiny" for India in the region now--and a need for contingency intervention forces.⁴³ Singh, on this as on other points the most belligerent of the Indians consulted, sees the great powers as trying to carve out spheres of influence in the area, (with the weapons of economic and military aid) but asserts that India has the potential power to challenge them--and that they find this worrisome.⁴⁴

Relations with the great powers: Chopra describes the Indo-Soviet treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation of August 1971 as reflecting a relationship developed over 15 years; and believes that, although not a true alliance, it may have deterred the PRC from intervention in the October 1971 war with Pakistan.⁴⁵ Baldwin expresses his concern at length over the

⁴¹ M. L. Sondhi, "India and Nuclear China," Military Review, September, 1973, p. 40.

⁴² Mahaj K. Chopra, "Southeast Asia: A New Perspective," Military Review, December, 1973, p. 62.

⁴³ Sondhi, p. 30. ⁴⁴ Singh, p. 42. ⁴⁵ Chopra, "...Environment," pp. 32-33.

relationship with the Soviets. In his survey of the lands "East of Suez", he states that, "despite the rugged terrain, overland communication routes from the Central Asian area to South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral have been intensively developed by both Russia and China."⁴⁶ Further, "a weak and fragmented Congress Party... and the menace of Chinese Communism, plus large sums of money and an Indian predilection for socialist slogans and sophistry, have helped Russia make deep inroads into India ... All this Soviet effort has not persuaded New Delhi to relinquish--at least in policy statements--her policy of nonalignment. But actually the first steps have been taken in the integration of the Indian economy--and the Indian military establishment--with the Russian... Today the nightmare of Indian foreign policy is the specter of a United States rapprochement with China ..." /this in 1970/⁴⁷

Suffice it to say that the PRC is viewed by Indian strategists with implacable fear and hatred. Halperin says of the Chinese: "Most important to them is the establishment of China as a major world, and nuclear, power. Peking also envisions the establishment of Chinese hegemony in Asia ... and recognition by all Asian countries of China's dominance."⁴⁸ This view is reinforced by Aspaturian who says that China is now seeking an

⁴⁶Baldwin, p. 207. ⁴⁷Baldwin, pp. 211-213. ⁴⁸Halperin, p. 70.

identity in an international system it has always scorned,⁴⁹ and that, although the United States and the Soviet Union may be disenchanted, this does not necessarily mean that China will not accept a role at the top.⁵⁰

United States-Indian relations have always been complex and marked by misunderstanding, often bitterness. Americans are baffled by Indians. We admired Gandhi and Nehru; we respect the "world's largest democracy"; we send grain and The Pill--and yet K. B. Singh can flatly charge us with being an "enemy of democracy."⁵¹ Chopra is somewhat more charitable and describes it as a "love-hate" relationship.⁵² Joseph De Rivera gives us an example of an early misunderstanding which occurred in 1950: "... many Americans, embittered by India's refusal to send troops to Korea, did not realize that India's reluctance was due to the Formosan intervention [by] the United States Seventh Fleet⁷ and its concern that this move would alienate the Chinese. As a result, some pressure was applied to try to influence India's decision. In turn, Indians began to feel that strings were being attached to American aid."⁵³ Chopra views the application of the Nixon Doctrine to South and

⁴⁹Aspaturian, p. 53. ⁵⁰Aspaturian, p. 55. ⁵¹Singh, p. 42.

⁵²Chopra, "... Environment", p. 32.

⁵³Joseph H. De Rivera, The Psychological Dimension of Foreign Policy (Columbus: Charles E. Merrill), 1968, p. 92.

Southeast Asia in this way: Noting that United States "withdrawal" creates a partial vacuum, he goes on to say, however, that, "while the United States is withdrawing, it continues to be a superpower. It would prevent the domination of a single power in the region, insist upon open seas and seek secure communications. India realizes this and may even look upon United States presence of this kind as a plus entry in its security balance sheet."⁵⁴ His compatriot, K. B. Singh, strongly disagrees. He sees the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC contending on the Indian subcontinent as they are everywhere else. He reports that Indians were shocked by the move of the Seventh Fleet in 1971 "into the Bay of Bengal against the Indian Navy" (Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, in a press conference on 30 November 1973, stated that these were "regular movements", which "will continue with more frequency.");⁵⁵ by the fact of the United States rapprochement with China; and that the United States had closed its eyes to Pakistani "barbarism." He goes on to say that, because the United States cannot permit a Moscow-New Delhi axis to overbalance a Washington-Peking axis, the United States must act now to strengthen Pakistan.⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Chopra, "...Environment," p. 32.

⁵⁵ James R. Schlesinger, Department of Defense Morning News Briefing, 30 November, 1973.

⁵⁶ Singh, pp. 42,43.

The Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is, of course, key to Indian influence from East Africa to Southeast Asia. But its role is viewed in different ways by different parties. Baldwin describes at length Soviet involvement with the Indian Navy and especially its facilities, to include the somewhat mysterious (Baldwin's characterization) Andaman Islands facilities, flanking the Southeast Asian peninsula. He voices his suspicion that, while the "Indian Government maintains that it provides the same facilities to all visiting naval craft of all nations ... there appears to be some legitimate doubt about this statement."⁵⁷ Not surprisingly, the Indians take a different view. Without exception, the Indian strategists consulted⁵⁸ saw India's aims as keeping the Indian Ocean free of great power dominance, if not competition, perhaps through constructing a naval alliance of regional powers.⁵⁹

Nuclear and other military hardware: In reviewing the prospects for nuclear proliferation and possible objectives

⁵⁷ Baldwin, pp. 211, 212.

⁵⁸ Chopra, "...Environment", p. 34; Singh, p. 45; Sondhi, p. 32.

⁵⁹ Australia, Indonesia, South African, Malaysia, Bangladesh, and Iran are mentioned. Terence R. Bates, in a student paper for the USAIGSC, notes that Australia considers herself "Asian", and would "honor commitments."

of a small nuclear power, the Hudson Institute notes that it is "clear that the distinct possibility exists that low-level but unacceptable damage could be inflicted on a super-power if it were to threaten or be tempted to use nuclear weapons to force overwhelming vital concessions from a weaker opponent."⁶⁰ Chopra considers current arms control arrangements to be not very adequate, but believed that India would keep a low nuclear profile for the time being.⁶¹ Sondhi, on the other hand, says that "India is no longer interested in retaining its profile as a member of the non-nuclear club." He fears the political meaning in the Third World of China being the only "non-white" nuclear power, and believes she sees an Indian nuclear dependence on Russia, which would be voided if India had her own nuclear capability. He says that India now views the great power non-proliferation policy as "brazen hypocrisy"; and concludes that "only a nuclear India can extract political, military, and economic advantages from the two superpowers." (He reasons that neither United States nor Soviet nuclear guarantees would be dependable because of the policy of mutual non-interference they have adopted, as demonstrated during the mining of Haiphong harbor.)⁶²

⁶⁰Hudson, p. 37. ⁶¹Chopra, "... Environment," p. 34.

⁶²Sondhi, pp. 34-38.

Singh merely notes that an arms race is justified by the struggle for existence.⁶³ As to the overall future of Indian defense materiel, Chopra forecasts a third five-year defense plan (1974-79) concentrating on qualitative improvements; considerable self-sufficiency in equipment, ships, and missiles; and "peaceful" nuclear applications.⁶⁴ (In this regard, Sondhi makes mention of technical imperatives for Indian nuclear development, e.g. propulsion, to monitor Chinese progress.⁶⁵)

Three "Perspectives": Once more Hudson Institute is called on to provide three purported American "perspectives" of India's future. Note particularly how much at variance with the Indian views quoted (with the possible exception of Chopra) is their ninth item on the "Austere Pragmatic Interventionist" list. The reader is reminded that these lists were prepared prior to the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PRUDENTIAL INTERNATIONALIST

INDIA

1. Government of highly literate, cosmopolitan elite, floating on or detached from poverty-

⁶³ Singh, p. 45.

⁶⁴ Chopra, "... Environment," p. 34.

⁶⁵ Sondhi, p. 30

stricken unprogressive mass; with many serious challenges to central authority (linguistic, etc.). Euphoria which came with the advent of independence has given way to almost total disillusionment. The racial and religious tensions have created fissiparous conditions and otherwise aggravated existing political problems.

2. Pockets of highly developed industry, but the priority given to industrialization over agriculture has resulted in such disastrous occurrences as famines. Economic programs are unable to cope with the rising tide of expectation.
3. Parliamentary democracy has been a success despite the high levels of illiteracy.
4. Communism in serious conflict with indigenous culture, way of life. There are no indications that communism is likely to spread successfully in India or take over the state.
5. India obsessed with Pakistan issue and fearful of China.
6. Less anti-American than decade ago.
7. Has lost former geographic sphere of influence and former prestige in international councils. These were basically ephemeral being based on accidents of time (cold war and rise of Third World) and personality (Nehru). This creates an opportunity for prudent American support for India.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AUSTERE PRAGMATIC INTERVENTIONIST

SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

1. The impact of the Vietnam war is likely to reinforce rebellion and dissidence throughout the area--which already includes much unrest of communal, racial, regionalist, and (in India) economic origin.

2. But the success or failure of such movements depends ultimately on local forces and the dynamism of a particular insurgent movement in capitalizing on essentially non-ideological sources of discontent.
3. Thus "Peoples' War" is not a valid instrumentality for one nation's aggression against another. The shared ideology of Thai and Vietnamese communists is operationally less important than the differences between Thai and Vietnamese society. Thailand's insurgents will be successful to the degree that Thai society itself provides--as it now does not--a motivation for large-scale rebellion. Foreign aid to the rebels--whether from Vietnam or China--can as easily be contraproductive as helpful.
4. Nor is the liberalism of a government, its formal democracy, or the pace of economic development a determining factor in an insurgent situation. The "legitimacy," the nationalism, of a government is more important to its ability to hold the allegiances of its people.
5. Foreign interventions in support of a government may thus do more damage than good, undermining the authenticity or legitimacy of the aided government in the eyes of populations which remain highly xenophobic.
6. The future of the area certainly will include much instability, but probably no more "Vietnams." The international importance of regional instability will depend on several variables, one of which is that major foreign interventions do not take place.
7. The question of major direct Chinese aggression is quite separate, although it is judged unlikely because of material limitations on Chinese power as well as internal factors within China.
8. India presents a unique problem of internal disintegration. The democratic achievement of India remains profoundly impressive: but if it fails by the 1975-1985 period, a possibility although not a probability, there would seem little useful that outside powers might do, and the consequences

would seem limited to India itself.

9. India's external problem of defense against China provides an example of congruent United States-Soviet interest, and this is likely to continue to be the case.
10. But India is unlikely to assume any significant role in the defense or political leadership of South Asian region as a whole. An increasingly inwardlooking and "nativist" India must be anticipated. To a lesser extent, this must be expected to be true of all the Southeast and South Asian states, possibly excluding Thailand and Singapore.

A TYPICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE AGGRESSIVE DEMOCRAT

INDIA

1. Nationalism is still a growing force; and having lasted twenty years India begins to look like a going concern. Further, considerable unity in the wake of threats from China and Pakistan. India plays a geopolitical role useful to the American position.
2. Agriculture is now given top priority and the grain harvest this year is 100,000,000 tons-- 15,000,000 more than the best previous year (1965). It is urgent that the United States help India with these problems; while there are serious problems, India will probably soon be self-sufficient in food. And the economic rate of growth is on the increase.
3. The success of parliamentary democracy indicates that American policies in India have been successful and it is urgent to continue them in order to insure continued success.
4. The Communist Party controls Kerala, dominates the administration in West Bengal: and may be able to exploit particularist and communal issues in other areas.

5. Properly seeking protection in de facto joint United States-Soviet Union guarantees rather than in self defense.
6. Slackening United States aid and United States unwillingness to help in India's arming may arrest any decline in anti-Americanism.
7. Unless India receives American support, much of blame for India's decline will be associated with American policies and India will turn toward the Soviet Union.

APPENDIX E

ANALYSIS OF THREAT/OPPORTUNITY AREAS

SOVIET UNION

Threat/Opportunity Area (T/O) 1a: Deideologization versus Ideological Petrefaction and Irrelevance

If Marxism-Leninism comes to play a role only in socialization (the creation of what was once called "Soviet Man") and is expressed only in cant, the objective of deideologizing our relations with the Soviet Union will certainly be served, at least on a technical level if not in dealing with mass audiences. Is the eventuation of this socio-psychological trend critical to the pursuit of our objective? Probably so. Is it related to the application of force? Probably not, except in the sense that any element of one's Weltanschauung affects one's choice of a course of action. No "informational objective," as defined in this paper is seen.

T/O 1b: Deideologization versus Economic/technical Needs

As regards relations between states, Russia's growing economic and technological needs should further the objective of deideologization, inasmuch as the principal suppliers of her requirements will be, of course, Western, capitalist democracies. However, in an age of overwhelming mass

communications, the influx of products and technology of capitalist origin may impose severe internal political strains on the Soviet system. To the degree that this internal tension is reflected in her external conduct, particularly in addressals to mass audiences, it may threaten our objective. This latter effect, however, would be, by definition, self-evident and is thereby not an informational objective. Furthermore, while plans or intentions to permit this effect would clearly meet the criterion of criticality, they do not meet the criterion of unambiguously involving the application of force.

T/O 1c: Deideologization versus Fear and Rigidity

The same analysis applies here, as was applied to T/O 1b. No informational objective.

T/O 1d: Deideologization versus Generational Succession

If, as Brzezinski suspects, the new leadership adopts a course combining pluralist evolution and technological adaptation, the generational succession would probably represent an opportunity. On the other hand, it is easy to imagine that such a succession could become disorderly, parties to it invoking foreign devils, ideological purity, or national pride and thereby creating situations with sharp crisis potential. There is no question that, in the generational succession, there is the possibility for changes in Soviet policy critical to the advancement of our objective. It also seems clear

that there is at least the strong possibility of such a change of course--especially if for the worse--manifesting itself in activity in the armed forces, particularly its leadership. While it is easy to understand such activity as a threat to our survival or other interests, it is difficult to claim in seriousness that it is a threat to our objective of deideologizing the relationship. Once again: no informational objective.

T/O 1e: Deideologization versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to China

Assuming that the most powerful argument which the Soviet Union has against the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the court of world opinion is charges of irresponsible, imperialistic, and xenophobic conduct (as contrasted with her own reasonableness), her need to isolate China furthers our objective of deideologizing the United States-Soviet bilateral relationship. It probably is not critical to it, however, and her withholding or applying force in the quarrel with China does not have a central bearing on this objective. No informational objective.

T/O 1f: Deideologization versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to Europe

A Soviet strategic objective of neutralizing Western Europe would probably be supportive of our objective of deideologizing the United States-Soviet relationship, because the Soviet Union would inevitably have to mute

ideological themes that continental governments would perceive as threatening their incumbency. Maintaining Eastern Europe as a strategic buffer, on the other hand, could occasion the use of ideological themes which would contrast starkly with the United States démarche toward several of the governments in that region. This would fall into T/O 6f, however, and will be discussed below. With that qualification, no informational objective meeting the criteria is seen here.

T/O 1g: Deideologization versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in regard to the United States

If a consensus can be drawn from the forecasts cited in Appendix D, it is that ideology has a small role in superpower relationships, at least in the minds or actions of decisionmaking élites, and that it will tend to have even less of a role in the future. While this appears to favor realization of our objective, once more, as with the two previous T/O areas, there seems little or no relationship here between an opportunity (in this case) and any involvement of force. No informational objective.

T/O 2a: New Economic Relationship versus Ideological Petrefaction and Irrelevance

Like any change, especially a demoralizing one, this trend can produce tension in the system. On the other hand, it should help to remove barriers to a new economic relationship which are of essentially ideological

origin. Sheer chagrin and frustration on the part of ideologically-oriented Soviet elites could well produce an anger which could find expression in threats with military undertones, and involve United States objectives of higher priority. No informational objective, however, is seen in this T/O area per se.

T/O 2b: New Economic Relationship versus Economic/technical Needs

In no other T/O area does "O" so clearly predominate over "T" as in this one. In the opinion of at least one observer (Cobb), it is the complementarity of United States and Soviet objectives in this area which drives detente. Since no implicit threat is apparent and the dovetailing of need would seem capable of propelling these programs without further searching for and exploiting directly related opportunities, no informational objective is seen.

T/O 2c: New Economic Relationship versus Fear and Rigidity

Fear and rigidity may, indeed, endanger our drive for a new economic relationship, especially if it becomes involved in a disputed succession. To bear implications for the use of force, however, it would have to be reflected in some other T/O area. No informational objective.

T/O 2d: New Economic Relationship versus Generational Succession

To perceive a critical threat or opportunity here requires some large assumptions: If an elite struggling to assume the leadership of the Soviet Union were to adopt as a "plank" of their "platform" the furtherance/hindrance of economic "interdependence" (Nixon's word), this clearly would threaten/aid pursuit of our objective. If in addition to one of these circumstances obtaining, our own economy had in the meantime become highly dependent on the relationship with the Soviet economy, then the criterion of criticality would be met. By a slightly longer stretch of the imagination, force implications could then be visualized. The writer, however, is persuaded by the extremely contingent nature of this scenario not to consider it as having immediate potential as an informational objective.

T/O 2e: New Economic Relationship versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to China

If, as Cobb says, the Soviets need of Western products and technology plays a greater role in her policy of detente than does her quarrel with China, she may tend to shape the latter to conform with the former, in which case no threat is presented to attainment of our objective. This writer cannot conceive of circumstances in which China would be in a position to propose an end to the confrontation in exchange for Russia's severing her economic relationship with the United States. If the inconceivable should happen, we are into another T/O area.

No informational objective.

T/O 2f: New Economic Relationship versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to Europe

As regards Eastern Europe, see T/O 6f below. Western Europe, of course, represents another source from which the Soviet Union can seek to fill some of her economic needs (e. g. the Fiat-built Togliatti auto plant). It is difficult, however, to conceive of either the United States or the Soviets injecting force implications into any effort to enforce or break exclusivity of bilateral commercial relationships. No informational objective.

T/O 2g: New Economic Relationship versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United States

Discussed in body of thesis.

T/O 3a: Survival versus Ideological Petrefaction and Irrelevance

To the degree that ideological petrefaction and irrelevance result in a less effective and inspiring Soviet state, the trend would be favorable to the attainment of our objective. To the degree that it results in strain or a lack of realism in the Soviet elites, however, it could conceivably be threatening. This would appear to be countered, however, if the Soviet Union becomes, in Brzezinski's words, "another spent, post-imperial power"¹ At any rate,

¹Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era (New York: Viking, 1970), p. 138.

this T/O area seems central to the nature of the threat posed by the principal competing state, and to involve decisions (perhaps negative) on our part having force implications. The informational objective: To determine the existence, the extent of, and effect on total Soviet national power of a trend toward ideological petrefaction and irrelevance. The EEI: How vigorous and relevant is current Soviet political philosophy within a Russian context, within an international context?

T/O 3b: Survival versus Economic/technical Needs

The discussion of T/O 2g, new economic relationship versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to the United states, in the body of the thesis, applies, to include the informational objective and EEI.

T/O 3c: Survival versus Fear and Rigidity

Fear, of course, hinders the attempt to move "from confrontation to negotiation." In this sense, fear and rigidity threaten the attainment of our objective. If, however, the rigidity is a deliberate policy imposed for internal purposes only and is not an important conscious factor in decisionmaking with regard to external affairs, it should not hinder the development of a habit of negotiation which has as its aim the survival of both parties. In the belief that the latter statement more accurately describes the nature of this trend, it is not regarded as critical to the attainment of the policy objective. No informational objective.

T/O 3d: Survival versus Generational Succession

It goes without saying that a period of strain in any system may exacerbate its external relations. In view of the optimism of the forecasts (especially Brzezinski, who examined the point in some depth), however, it is not seen as fundamentally threatening to our survival. Certainly the possibility exists that our relationship could be disturbed at least temporarily, but this does not equate to a threat to survival. The Russians simply do not have a history of allowing suicidal tendencies to influence their external affairs decisionmaking, although real interests would, of course. Thus, the idea of a party struggling for succession adopting terminal conflict with the United States as a policy to aid in that succession has little rational appeal. See also the discussion at T/O 2g, however. No informational objective.

T/O 3e: Survival versus Soviet Strategic Requirementsin Regard to China

Balancing the security interests of the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC is the foundation of the current stability, defined as the absence of central war. Any jarring of this balance, other than the total removal as actors of the other two powers, is threatening to our survival. We must know (informational objective) of Soviet capabilities and intentions, if any, to destroy or drastically reduce Chinese power, to concede greatly enhanced security to China, to involve the United States

militarily in accomplishing either of the foregoing, or to take any action in regard to China which could indirectly affect our survival (e. g. create disastrous fallout levels). The EEI: Will the Soviet Union forcibly alter the relative power of China; if so, when and in what manner?

T/O 3f: Survival versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in
Regard to Europe

It is obvious that the perceived Soviet objectives in regard to Europe can run counter to United States interests. Whether they threaten our physical survival is another question entirely (although the two could merge over time if unchecked pursuit of tactical objectives were permitted the Soviets). It would appear that the Soviet's rather limited and very carefully pursued objectives in regard to Europe, while they can be disruptive of other United States objectives, do not critically threaten her survival. No informational objective.

T/O 3g: Survival versus Soviet Strategic Requirements
in Regard to the United States

The consensus of the forecasts consulted seemed to be that the Soviet Union seeks no more than security from the United States; that is, our objectives coincide and their realization must be found together. While this may be more a reflection of forecast selection than of "truth," under the rules established in Chapters I and II it will be accepted. If there exists, in fact, what

Shelling calls a "two-sided adaptive system" (i. e. the Soviets will adjust their defense effort up or down to match ours, and vice versa)², there is ipso facto no threat to our survival, except through our own action, e. g. sudden abdication of parity. This is not to say that this system is not crucially dependent on effective monitoring of each other's defense posture, for it is. But as long as the system operates, there is no threat. No informational objective, assuming the forecasts are accurate.

T/O 4a: Reduced Cost versus Ideological Petrefaction
and Irrelevance

As the reader may have noted, identifying reduced defense costs may have been as much due to the writer's wider observations as to anything explicit or implicit in USFP IV. Accepting its reality, one must go on to note the extreme sensitivity of defense budgets to periods of tension--sometimes for purposes of demonstration, and sometimes as the effect of other policy decisions (e. g. to provide aid to a threatened area). One must conclude, therefore, that any threat, even very contingent ones, to national security is, perforce, a threat to the objective of reducing costs. Any eventuality which would raise defense costs disastrously can be assumed to involve

²Thomas C. Shelling, "Managing the Arms Race," Problems of National Strategy (ed. Henry A. Kissinger; New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 375.

a critical threat to some more truly vital objective. Because of this relationship of all other objectives to the objective of reducing costs, the writer cannot see that any useful purpose would be served by a comparison of the latter with each of the seven forecast trends for the Soviet Union. No informational objectives will be educed from T/O areas 4a through 4g.

T/O 5a: Reassurance of Allies versus Ideological Petrefaction and Irrelevance

Ideological petrefaction and irrelevance among Soviet elites is not seen as having crucial relevance to attainment of the objective of reassuring allies. While the threat may be perceived as diminished, it may also be perceived as volatile. Thus a high level of danger is maintained; while at the same time adequate justification is provided the United States for further disengagement in Europe. In balance, the trend is seen as slightly threatening to the objective. No informational objective.

T/O 5b: Reassurance of Allies versus Economic/technical Needs

The growing interdependence of the Russian and American economies will surely be seen by Europeans as gravely threatening to a continuing strong United States presence in Europe. It may be said that the Soviet Union's economic need is in conflict with Western Europe's psychological and political need (with respect to United States

presence). The force implications of this conflict relate to a nonviolent use of military force, namely its stationing on European soil. Inasmuch as we are assuming that the Soviet's economic need of us is greater than ours of the Soviets, it is difficult to conceive of this economic relationship being used by the Soviets to force steps by us which would tend to demoralize allies--which is not to say that we might not take such steps for other reasons, e. g. to satisfy domestic demands for further reductions in military manpower. No informational objective.

T/O 5c: Reassurance of Allies versus Fear and Rigidity

The rationale is similar to that used to describe T/O areas 5a and b above. The Soviet Union is apt to be making more threatening noises, but these will be intended for domestic consumption. They will have the effect, however, of increasing European unease, although probably not to a crucial degree. No informational objective.

T/O 5d: Reassurance of Allies versus Generational Succession

Any irritation of the Russian bear tends to increase the need of our European allies for reassurance. A succession struggle would be such an irritation. It is most unlikely, however, that the United States would consider the use of threat of force in order to influence the Soviet succession in a manner reassuring to the former's allies. No informational objective.

T/O 5e: Reassurance of Allies versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to China

The nature of this conflict between objective and trend is best described in President Nixon's own words:

...as the relaxation of East-West tensions became more pronounced, some of our allies questioned whether the United States would remain committed to Europe or would instead pursue a new balance of power in which the older alignments would be diluted and distinctions between allies and adversaries would disappear [as in the PRC promotion of NATO]. Apprehensions may be inevitable in a period of confrontation. As relations between adversaries are ameliorated, those not directly involved tend to worry that their own interests are somehow subordinate to new relationships.

On the other side of the coin, the Soviets could perceive any move (or failure to act, e. g. to remove troops) on our part, intended to reassure European allies, as seeking to exploit her confrontation with China. There is a distinct conflict potential here, and since it involves both potential use or threat of force, as well as the stationing of actual forces, it seems to meet the criteria for an informational objective. Assuming the Soviet-Chinese confrontation is no less dangerous in the forecast period, we would need to know, for the sake of reassuring our West European allies, how the Soviets would view United States force levels and policies in NATO; that is, would they view current arrangements or changes thereto, as being contrary to prior understandings regarding the triangular balance, or as threatening to their security requirements

in regard to China. EEI: What criteria would the Soviet leadership apply to measures taken by the United States to reassure her European allies, in order to determine whether those measures were threatening to Soviet strategic requirements in regard to China?

T/O 5f: Reassurance of Allies versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to Europe

The fact is, of course, that Soviet strategic objectives in Europe are the threat regarding which the Europeans seek reassurance. In order to reassure our allies, we must know how the Soviets see their strategic requirements, and what they intend to do and are capable of doing to meet them. That reassurance would almost certainly have force implications. The criteria for an informational objective are met. The suggested EEI: What are Soviet plans (intentions wedded to capabilities) with regard to Western Europe?

T/O 5g: Reassurance of Allies versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United States

Assuming the forecasts are correct, the overriding Soviet strategic requirement in regard to the United States is survival, and parity the basic strategy. Parity, however, may be perceived by NATO allies as insufficiently reassuring, particularly in light of the high uncertainty of confining any conflict to the European continent. An advantage to the United States, while reassuring to our allies, is

threatening to Soviet strategic requirements and, therefore, ultimately threatening to us. This writer believes that the objective of reassurance of allies simply will not be allowed to drive our policy, if it conflicts with an objective on the order of survival (and corollary issues such as the cost of an arms race). In short, while their impact on the objective of reassuring allies would be of interest and even importance, it is not this impact which makes our need to understand Soviet strategy so great, but the issue of survival. See also T/O 3g above. No informational objective.

T/O 6a: Eastern Europe versus Ideological Petrefaction
and Irrelevance

It may be that the trend referenced is the principal enabling factor for attainment of our objective of creating an "opening" toward Eastern Europe. But, just as it is a "demonstration" area for our announced policy of non-ideological exchanges of mutual advantage, and against spheres of influence, so is it the Soviets' prime geopolitical buffer zone, as well as an important source of markets and resources (although perhaps not as important as formerly). Thus, vital interests of the Soviets are engaged in this area, while our interests are merely important; and any challenge by the Soviets to our interests would certainly be successful, unless our aim was provocation. Therefore, the writer believes that we would exploit petrefaction and irrelevance only to the point

of challenge, and information concerning such a challenge ipso facto does not meet the criterion of criticality to become an informational objective.

T/O 6b: Eastern Europe versus Economic/technical Needs

The same analysis applies. Further, in this case, it is in our interest to exploit the trend at the expense of attaining the objective. No informational objective.

T/O 6c: Eastern Europe versus Fear and Rigidity

A possible manifestation of fear and rigidity could be in insistence on maintaining or increasing ideological and political dependence of Eastern Europe on the Soviet Union, to include the reduction or cessation of contacts with the United States. Once more, however, the assumed lower priority of this objective means that, by definition, it will not be challenged. There exists also, of course, the possibility that Eastern European dismay at Soviet fearful rigidity could enhance our opportunities, but it seems doubtful that such a development would be greater than current circumstances by an order of magnitude. No informational objective.

T/O 6d: Eastern Europe versus Generational Succession

The previous arguments based on the low priority and tangential nature of the objective apply. No informational objective.

T/O 6e: Eastern Europe versus Soviet Strategic Requirements

with Regard to China

Any weakening of the security which the Eastern European states currently afford the Soviet Union would be threatening to her in two ways: in respect to her fear of the West; and as weakening her capability against China. If the United States dемарш toward Eastern Europe appears to be having this effect, it would certainly be strongly challenged. It seems not to have been so perceived to date. However, since the Moscow agreement specifically provides for the protection of each other's legitimate security interests⁴, there is no doubt that if the Soviet Union communicated that she felt threatened in this area, the United States, as in the other 6-series T/O areas, would back off. In fact, because of the sensitivity of this issue to United States-Soviet relations, the United States could be expected to make a deliberate effort to sense at the earliest possible moment such a Soviet perception. Nevertheless, for reasons stated previously, there is no informational objective here.

T/O 6f: Eastern Europe versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to Europe

The openings we gain in Eastern Europe can be said to constitute a sort of defense against Soviet moves, political or otherwise, against Western Europe. They are chips which can be laid on a bargaining table, much as

⁴USFP IV, p. 38.

the obsolescent Thor missiles in Turkey were in 1962-- and with comparable cost to our side. But this situation would relate more to T/O area 7f. See also T/O areas 1f and 2f above. No informational objective.

T/O 6g: Eastern Europe versus Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United States

The same rationale is maintained as used previously: If the Soviets communicated that they felt their basic requirement of parity (balance) with the United States was threatened by whatever influence we were gaining in Eastern Europe, we would slow or cease pursuit of our objective in that area. No informational objective.

T/O 7a: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus Ideological Petrefaction and Irrelevance

This seems to be an objective of very high, if not highest, priority. On the other hand, the trend would seem enhancing to it, not threatening. It is also possible, however, that diminished importance of ideology--if this is implicit in petrefaction and irrelevance--could make the Soviet Union seem less threatening if not more attractive to those whom she might seek to woo. Information on this complex development would, therefore, be very important to us--the writer is even willing to concede that it could be critical to pursuit of our objective. Whether force has any role in "combating" ideological petrefaction and irrelevance as a factor in

the growth of Soviet influence is another question.

It seems unlikely. No informational objective.

T/O 7b: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Economic/technical Needs

Of all the 49 T/O areas described in this section, this is probably the only one discussed daily in the press of middle America. Considerable vigilance will be required to ensure that our manner of responding to Soviet economic and technological needs does not enhance her ability to expand her influence to an unacceptable degree. The criterion of criticality seems to be met. Would the threat or use of force be considered by either side to attain her ends in this regard? Probably only if the exchange had been allowed to become critical to some aspect of national security, e. g. total dependence for some strategic material, which seems most unlikely. It seems much more likely that each side will be careful to keep the relationship finely tuned to avoid such an eventuality. Thus, a national EEI may be involved here, but not a national-military EEI. (It should also be noted that the input of military intelligence analysts would be required for an assessment of the trade relationship, but not necessarily that of military intelligence collectors.) No informational objective.

T/O 7c: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Fear and Rigidity

The forecasts in this area were highlighted by two observations: Vernon D. Aspaturian's that "system parity may afford a better basis for stability than nuclear parity⁵; Henry A. Kissinger's that increased control over the domestic environment may reduce flexibility in foreign affairs.⁶ Thus, while Soviet effectiveness may be lessened, volatility may increase. On the other hand, Soviet elites may see an answer to their fears in a mutual effort toward "system parity"--but then our premise would no longer exist. Certainly it is conceivable that fear could drive the leadership to seek expanded influence; likewise, such a course of action would almost certainly have some force implications.

The informational objective: To be current as to the outlook of the Soviet leadership; and to determine the existence or growth of a belief that their options are being narrowed down to those that include the threat or use of force. The EEI: Has fear of the inroads of Western influence combined with an inability to visualize constructive actions, due to self-generated rigidity of thought and behavior, led the Soviet leadership to a consideration of the use of force in order to expand their influence (buffer against further inroads)?

⁵Vernon D. Aspaturian, "The USSR, the USA and China in the Seventies," Military Review, January, 1974, p. 63.

⁶Henry A. Kissinger, American Foreign Policy (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 18.

T/O 7d: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Generational Succession

Barring the realization of Brzezinski's sanguine, not to say unrealistic, prognosis for the outcome of the leadership succession, the manner of its development would seem critical to the attainment of our objective. It also seems likely that the role of force will be an issue debated among the contending factions and personalities. The informational objective: To identify the leaders and eventual winners in the generational succession struggle at the earliest date, and to learn their views and intentions in regard to the role which force will play in their programs. The EEI: Who are the new Soviet leaders and what is their intended use of and degree of control over the forces at their disposal?

T/O 7e: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to China

Total elimination by the Soviets of the Chinese threat would be disastrous to our attainment of this objective. Such an eventuality could inter alia profoundly affect our position vis-a-vis the Soviets in both Europe and the Third World. More fundamentally, of course, it would largely destroy the basis of the current system of great power stability. In the meantime, it appears that the Soviets, in seeking to gain strategic advantage over China, are attempting to expand their influence in South and Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. The

informational objective is to detect significant advantage gained by the Soviets in their strategic struggle with the Chinese, and to learn of any intentions to engage in major war with them. The EEI: What are Soviet intentions toward the PRC?

T/O 7f: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to Europe

This T/O area has, of course, been the object of intense interaction with the Soviet Union for a number of years, and promises to be so for many more. The Soviet aim of neutralizing--or "Finlandizing" in the popular phrase--Europe is at the heart of the problem of reducing American forces in Europe. A decline in her influence in Eastern Europe may, in fact, make it seem more imperative to the Soviets to expand her influence in Western Europe--substituting depth for firmness in her buffer zone. We must be aware of her capabilities, plans, and intentions to do so. The EEI: What are Soviet intentions toward Western Europe; how would they be affected by alternative United States courses of action?

T/O 7g: Restraint of Growth of Soviet Influence versus
Soviet Strategic Requirements in Regard to the United
States

Parity, as a goal of Soviet strategy, has implications for the growth of influence. Parity may be pursued, for example, by seeking a more favorable geographical

basis to offset a disadvantage in sophistication of weaponry. The combined factors of parity and an increasingly multipolar world, as described by Brzezinski⁷ may widen the areas of contention between the United States and the Soviet Union. Soviet strategic objectives vis-a-vis the United States, therefore, seem to be critical to attainment of our objective of restraining the spread of her influence. However, within the strict confines of this T/O area, the activity would seem likely to be predominantly political/diplomatic--as is currently the case in the Middle East where the Soviet Union seeks (primarily, in the writer's view) access to the Indian Ocean--and to involve military forces only through the grossest miscalculation. If one is to account the massive input of military hardware during the recent war as meeting the criterion of involving force, and examines the question in that still narrower perspective, it seems to lose its criticality. No informational objective.

INDIA

T/O 1a: Prevention of Dominance versus Regional Hegemony

The opposition of objectives and trend could not be clearer, and reflects a current situation which is projected to continue (unless the objective is changed). The problem in this case, therefore, is not one of detection.

⁷Brzezinski, p. 285.

The information needed concerns the exercise by India of the hegemony which is hers--actualizing the conflict of objective and trend (or, in this case, current status). Are there force implications? One must assume so since a naval demonstration has already been used to show our displeasure concerning the trend. The EEI: When, where, and in what manner does India intend to exploit her dominance over smaller powers in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral?

T/O 1b: Prevention of Dominance versus Great Power

Relations

Discussed in body of thesis.

T/O 1c: Prevention of Dominance versus Indian Role in
the Indian Ocean

India's principal aim with regard to the Indian Ocean is to keep it free of great power dominance. She need not enjoy hegemony in South Asia to accomplish this, although it would certainly help. In fact, talk seems to center on the construction of a naval alliance of other-than-great powers of the Indian Ocean basin to enforce this aim. Therefore, there is no direct and central relationship between our policy objective and the forecast trend--which is not to say we are uninterested, for one of our principal, non-regional aims is freedom of the seas. Since the development of the trend is not critical to the attainment of our objective, no informational

objective is recognized.

T/O 1d: Prevention of Dominance versus New Weaponry

Obviously, the objective and the outlook are in opposition (understanding, of course, that Indian dominance can no longer be "prevented"--it is a fact; but we seek to restrain its exercise). We would be interested to know about Indian weapons development, especially the development of nuclear weapons, and how it affected her capabilities and intention to exercise her regional dominance. Certainly an order of magnitude improvement in India's weaponry could be critical to our objective of preventing (restraining) regional dominance. But would American and Indian forces face each other over the issue of regional dominance alone (not involving denial of United States access to the Indian Ocean or other issues), regardless of the weapons the latter had acquired? Unlikely. In other words, while the potential exists for conflict between objective and trend, the issue is not sufficiently central to have force implications, as far as the United States is concerned. No informational objective.

T/O 2a: Exclusion of Great Powers versus Regional Hegemony

There is no question, in reading the description of United States objectives in Appendix C that, although couched in universal terms, the United States policy of exclusion is aimed at the Soviet Union. As has been

mentioned several times already, this would deprive India of her most powerful shield against China, and is therefore unacceptable to her. How much her regional hegemony reflects or affects her power to do anything about the American policy is questionable. On the other hand, how far the United States would go in trying to restrain Soviet moves around China's southern flank is equally problematical. Our commitment to this objective certainly has its limits, as indicated by our assistance in clearing the Suez Canal, regardless of the desirability of having China and Russia more or less keep each other in check. The writer assumes that this is a "limited liability" objective because concerns more vital than ours are involved. That being the case, it is doubtful if the criterion of force implication can be met. No informational objective.

T/O 2b: Exclusion of Great Powers versus Great Power

Relations

At the risk of over-simplifying, Indian objectives with respect to the superpowers and the PRC could be summarized as follows: Hope China will not attack; seek to ensure that a Soviet nuclear umbrella will deter such an attack; try to keep the United States from meddling in these affairs, especially as long as she seems so friendly toward China. The role she assigns to Russia appears to run counter to our objective. Any yet, as discussed in relation to the previous T/O area, it is

difficult to conceive of our acting forcibly to prevent India's establishing the relationship with the Soviet Union which she desires. The only possibility foreseen which would represent a serious danger to us would be that of the Soviets, by virtue of their relationship with India, somehow gaining overwhelming advantage over the PRC. But that relates more to our objectives with regard to the Soviet Union than to our objectives with regard to India. The other danger in such a relationship would be exclusion from the Indian Ocean, a subject which belongs in T/O area 2c. Neither criticality nor force involvement are clearly seen. No informational objective.

T/O 2c: Exclusion of Great Powers versus Indian Role in the Indian Ocean

To judge from the discussions found of a naval alliance to enforce freedom of the seas in the Indian Ocean, the Indian aims in this one regard seem to parallel our own. Their professions along these lines seem to belie suspicions, such as Hanson Baldwin's, that India's true aim is to turn the Indian Ocean into a Russian lake. Our own policy-makers, too, seem to have discounted the latter view in volunteering to help clear the Suez Canal. Is the role played by India critical to our aim of avoiding one-power rule of the Indian Ocean? Doubtful, inasmuch as, if it seemed important enough, the Soviets could probably work their will in this area if India opposed them alone. It may well be critical to know what the

Soviets are doing in the Indian Ocean; it is important to know what India is doing there, but not critical. No informational objective.

T/O 2d: Exclusion of Great Powers versus New Weaponry

As is the case with the purported interest in a naval alliance, improved Indian weaponry would seem to reduce the opportunities for great power influence in the area, especially if greater self-sufficiency is sought at the same time. There is also, of course, the likelihood that Indian possession of some nuclear capability would be regionally destabilizing. Whether such destabilization would tend to invite great power intervention, or whether the possession by India of even a small nuclear capability would deter them is not known. But we would look for answers to these questions primarily in Moscow and Peking, not in New Delhi. No informational objective.

T/O 3a: Alliances versus Regional Hegemony

Our opening toward China may not have had the aim of threatening India, but there seems little question that it had that effect. While India views the American-Chinese understandings as threatening and enjoys regional hegemony in South Asia, our professions about non-hostile alignments--others' as well as ours--will tend to fall on deaf ears. Our objective is that our alliances and those contracted by others have defensive, not offensive or aggrandizing, purposes. The fact of Indian regional

hegemony does not seem to have much of a causal relationship to attainment of this objective. No informational objective.

T/O 3b: Alliances versus Great Power Relations

In the Shanghai Communique, President Nixon stated, in effect, that no agreement between two countries should prejudice a third. But it appears that the Treaty between India and the Soviet Union could appear threatening to China; and it further appears that this is the main intent of the agreement, at least as far as India is concerned today. While the words of the Shanghai Communique may have been intended primarily for Soviet consumption, a conflict is nevertheless created by the Indian policy. It could be considered critical from an exemplary standpoint. Are there force implications? It is conceivable that the United States could mount or suggest a demonstration to indicate to India that we might be considered as an alternate to the Soviet Union in the role of guarantor; although how this could be done without conveying quite another suggestion to the Soviet Union, e. g. remove Soviet forces from the Indian Ocean, is problematical. Nevertheless, it seems worth looking into. The informational objective: To determine whether and under what conditions India would consider discarding the Soviet Union as her guarantor against China; to determine what the Soviet reaction would be to such a move on the part of India, e. g. would the Soviets consider the United States to be

more reliable than India as a southern counterweight to China, or less reliable? An EEI: Would India accept a United States offer to guarantee her safety from nuclear attack by China, in place of the Soviet "umbrella"?

T/O 3c: Alliances versus India's Role in the Indian Ocean

If India should succeed in gaining control over (not eliminating) great power presence in the Indian Ocean, perhaps through constructing a naval alliance of regional powers, it would probably enhance our pursuit of this objective (non-offensive alliances). Further, it would be important for us to know of her progress in this endeavor. However, the interaction with India would almost surely be political-diplomatic and not involve force as an instrument. No informational objective.

T/O 3d: Alliances versus New Weaponry

If more advanced weapons technology and more self-sufficiency in armaments would mean more independence from the Soviet Union for India, and less need for her to rely on an implicitly offensive alliance with the Soviets, it would enhance our pursuit of this particular objective, regardless of what other implications such a development might have. In that narrow sense, then, there is no threat involved--and no military implications, other than the possible provision of technical assistance. (The threat which a small Nth power can present to a great power, even if credible, does not fit within this T/O area.) No informational objective.

T/O 4a: Idealism versus Regional Hegemony

While the popular conception of India as a needy recipient might suffer somewhat if the fact of her regional hegemony were understood by the mass of American voters, the idealistic element in United States foreign policy stems from other sources in the American psyche (e. g. the missionary tradition) than mere consideration of power equations. Furthermore, since aid is given at the behest of a humanitarian electorate, albeit indirectly, it is ended primarily by disillusionment and withdrawal, not through any external threat. Therefore, there is, by definition, neither threat nor opportunity and, consequently, no informational objective (in the sense of supporting a policy objective).

T/O 4b-d

The same line of reasoning is applied as in T/O 4a above, with the same results.

T/O 5a: Economic Objectives versus Regional Hegemony

It is difficult to visualize any impact of the trend on this objective, when confined to India. Of course, Indian hegemony in South Asia could complicate realization of our economic objectives with regard to other South Asian states, but that would be outside the bounds of this study. If anything, the objective and the trend are probably mutually supportive. Conceivably, her desire to maintain or enhance her regional

hegemony could impel India to seek certain kinds of trade or aid which the United States does not intend to provide, but this is not likely since it would tend to imperil the programs already in effect, which presumably are more needed by India than by the United States. (The writer has heard that India has a near-monopoly on industrial-grade mica, but the matter seems so tangential that--combined with an inability within resources to confirm it--the possibility of this providing India with important leverage will not be pursued further.) No informational objective.

T/O 5b: Economic Objectives versus Great Power Relations

Indian self-reliance is an expressly-stated part of our economic objectives.⁸ It has apparently been decided that any attempt to contrive an Indian economic dependency on the United States will not be pursued. Moreover, nowhere in USFP IV is it expressly stated that we want more from this program than Indian self-reliance; although stability and American access to natural resources are mentioned in a general context of the "Developing Nations."⁹ One is led to believe, therefore, that the only threat in the trend to our economic objective would lie in a great power relationship somehow lessening Indian progress toward economic self-reliance. It is conceivable that the Soviets might have this in mind--to reinforce

⁸USFP IV, p. 148. ⁹USFP IV, p. 172.

India's alignment with them--but no indications of this were found. The trend in India's relations with great powers does not appear to present either threats or opportunities of enough significance to justify an informational objective.

T/O 5c: Economic Objectives versus India's Role in the Indian Ocean

The only relationship seen between the objective and the trend is the expense which could be required to attain India's apparent aim of creating a balancing naval presence in the Indian Ocean. However, that she has already considered this risk is indicated by the references to sharing the burden with regional allies. It seems a safe assumption that India would not seriously endanger the economic component of her national security in seeking her maritime goals. No informational objective.

T/O 5d: Economic Objectives versus New Weaponry

The same rationale was applied here, as in T/O 5c above; although the matter has been publicly debated in this country since India's recent nuclear detonation. No informational objective.

APPENDIX F

ANALYSIS OF EEI FOR TARGETS

SOVIET UNION

EEI: "In regard to what items would the Soviet Union contemplate the use or threat of force to ensure freedom to trade; where, in what manner, and to what degree?" (Source: T/O area 2g: new economic relationship versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to the United States; T/O area 3b: survival versus economic/technical needs.) Discussed in body of thesis.

EEI: "How vigorous and relevant is current Soviet political philosophy within a Russian context, within an international context?" (Source: T/O area 3a: survival versus ideological petrefaction and irrelevance.)

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: The scope of the EEI could hardly be wider in geographical terms. Every Communist and neutral country is involved, in addition to segments of the societies of the Western democracies, to include Japan. Within the Soviet Union leading ideologues, more analytic students of political philosophy, and leading dissenters would have to be consulted for their views and their influence measured. In other Communist countries, those who deal with the Soviet Union would have to be added to the ideologues, students, and dissenters. In non-

Communist countries, nearly every intellectual and shaper of opinion would have to be considered as a potential target. The assistance of the most qualified political and area analysts in the United States intelligence community would be needed to establish a sorting principle, or to review prospects proposed by the operational elements.

Time: This is a continuing requirement and concerns an intellectual and psychological trend which, if it becomes fact, will do so slowly and over several years. Time is not a limiting factor.

Risk: No unusual risk; in fact, these operations could very well appear to be more-or-less innocent scholarly researches, if not almost social.

Cost-effectiveness analysis.

Photint: Not applicable

Sigint: Little potential, and then only with an extremely high-level capability which could intercept the most private conversation of the most influential circles in the more electronically advanced countries.

Exploitative Humint: Very strong capability. Open sources should be able to virtually satisfy the EEI, except against the most rigidly controlled societies. Even in the latter case, the principal shortcoming would be in timeliness rather than ultimate capability. This is illustrated by the

Solzhenitsyn case.

Conclusion: The scope of this EEI is too broad for a primary application (defined in Chapter III) of the controlled Humint technique. It may be suitable for a secondary application in the most closely controlled societies. Primary reliance for satisfaction of this EEI should be placed on exploitation of open sources.

EEI: "Will the Soviet Union forcibly alter the relative power of China; if so, when and in what manner?"
(Source T/O 3e: Survival versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to China).

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: This is a case in which the information could be found at a myriad of levels in the political and military hierarchy of the Soviet Union, but in which the timeliness is improved as the level is raised. The most timely information must be sought at the highest political-military decision-making level. As was the case with the first EEI discussed, the target selection will be extremely narrow and, if anything, even more constrained in terms of target organizations.

Time: Time is even more of a problem than it was with the first EEI. On the one hand, this is a current

threat; on the other hand, T_r (one time report) could well be even longer. Criticality, however, is of a very high order and compensates for the impossibility of meeting the optimal goal in terms of timeliness, which is immediate accomplishment.

Risk: Risk is high. Discovery of the operation would certainly be considered provocative, perhaps even dangerous, by the Soviets, but the criticality to United States decision-makers is probably high enough to outweigh the risk, if the operation is sound and promising.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: The capability is very high, but only after decisions have been made. Photint can be partially defeated in this case by a careful effort to portray preparatory measures as normal activity.

Sigint: The capability is high but, as in the case of Photint, only after decisions have been made.

Exploitative Humint: Negligible capability, and that principally from third country sources.

Conclusion: The prize is worth a great deal of effort and risk. Controlled Humint is inherently capable of attacking decision-making activity; but in this case, for both redundancy and comprehensiveness, an integrated effort of all systems is indicated.

EEI: "What criteria would the Soviet leadership apply to measures taken by the United States to reassure her European allies, in order to determine whether those measures were threatening to Soviet strategic requirements in regard to China?" (Source:T/O 5e: Reassurance of allies versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to China.)

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: The data required--the criteria are especially difficult in this EEI, because they are apt not to articulated until the need of their application arises. This being the case, an unusually intimate relationship with the original source of the data--the decision-maker and his closest advisors--must be sought. This puts the target in the same very narrow category as in previous cases, where information regarding policy questions was in the hands only of those capable of acting on their intentions.

Time: The requirement is current. It is also urgent, due to the present need for reassurance of United States allies and the uncertainty as to how the Soviets perceive their vital interests vis-a-vis China. The operation, however, is in the same most difficult and time-consuming category as others in which the top-most Soviet leadership is the target.

Risk: Despite the criticality of the matter, it is

quite conceivable that little risk would be involved, other than to operational personnel directly involved (liability for the act, rather than the object of espionage). The reason for this apparent paradox is that, if the Soviet leaders were clear in their own minds on the criteria they might very well wish to communicate these to the United States government as a pre-emptive measure.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: Not applicable.

Sigint: Not applicable, if the criteria have not been decided upon. Otherwise, there is a capability, although the targets would be difficult.

Exploitative Humint: Highly capable, if the decision were made to signal the criteria; but, in that case, this becomes more of a diplomatic matter than an intelligence matter.

Conclusion: Probably only controlled Humint offers even a remote possibility of satisfying this EEI, barring Soviet action which removes it from the category of informational objective.

EEI: "What are Soviet plans with regard to Western Europe?" (Source: T/O 5f: Reassurance of allies versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to Europe).

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: The structure of the Threat/Opportunity area dictated the scope of this EEI: therefore, it is bonafide. That fact, however, does not lessen the difficulty of the analysis for targets. It should also be noted that, unlike some of the other EEI, it deals with capabilities as well as intentions. The ways of dealing with the question of capabilities are so numerous as to defy listing here. Intentions, again, are examined only at the highest levels of the government/party, and the foreign and defense ministers. Plans--the documents which wed intentions with capabilities after guidance is decided upon and issued--would be found at the top level and in the planning agencies of the foreign and defense ministries. This EEI is so broad, and the ways of attacking it so varied and numerous, that simple, definitive statements cannot be made about the time and risk factors.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

For reasons described above, this EEI is too broad for the usual cost-effectiveness analysis to be applied. Each of the systems could provide a wealth of information which would contribute to satisfaction of this EEI.

EEI: "Has fear of the inroads of Western influence combined with an inability to visualize constructive actions, due

to self-generated rigidity of thought and behavior, led the Soviet leadership to a consideration of the use of force in order to expand her influence (buffer against further inroads)?"
(Source: T/O area 7c: Restraint of growth of Soviet influence versus fear and rigidity).

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: As was the case with the fifth EEI, the unusual form of this EEI is dictated by the structure of the T/O area from which it was derived. It also bears a similarity to the second EEI, in that the subject is concerned with highly intangible matters: Mood or style and their causes. Problems with the requirement aside, the target is well-defined: the Soviet leadership, more particularly those who shape the style of decision-making at the top, or who are intimately involved with them on a daily basis. Once again, an extremely difficult target, whose selection was driven by the very fundamental nature of the question asked.

Time: See previous discussions on this type of target.

Risk: Very high, because it concerns "consideration of the use of force," usually the most closely guarded of all areas of governmental decision-making.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: Some capability to collect against "consider-

ation of the use of force," but none as to the reasons why.

Sigint: Some capability, once matters reach the discussion stage.

Exploitative Humint: Capability may be quite good against the mental-processes component of the EEI.

Conclusion: A difficult and risky operation against a very narrow requirement, eased somewhat by the exploitative capability. Risk versus gain must be carefully considered in this. This EEI, as written, is probably not worth the effort. The components of it could probably be incorporated in some other informational objective for more efficient collection management. If it must, nevertheless, be attacked, the two Humint techniques in combination offer the most promise.

EEI: "Who are the new Soviet leaders and what is their intended use of and degree of control over the forces at their disposal?" (Source:T/O area 7d: Restraint of growth of Soviet influence versus generational succession).

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: Although a single sentence, this EEI contains two requirements. The first could be answered by awaiting the event and then reading the newspapers. The intent here, however, is to identify leaders in the succession struggle as early as possible so that their past statements and policies can be studied

for indications of what may be expected of them in the future. To answer the second part of the question the quest must be broadened to include their relationships with military figures, and their understanding of military matters. This is another very narrow target at the highest levels of the party and government, although much contributing data may be found on the public record.

Time: As indicated by the level of access required, this promises to be a very time-consuming operation to mount. On the other hand, the critical time probably lies in the mid-range; it is not an immediate requirement, barring the unforeseen.

Risk: The risk is high, but the operation, if discovered, would probably not be considered very threatening, in a national security sense, as long as the results were not being released or "leaked" to the public.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: No capability.

Sigint: No capability; except for historical research material on personalities.

Exploitative Humint: Fairly good capability, especially prior to matters entering a crisis stage.

Conclusion: Only controlled Humint, and that with great difficulty could provide a reporting capability during the crisis period, from a recognition that an immediate leadership

problem exists to its resolution.

EEI: "What are Soviet intentions toward the PRC?"

(Source: T/O area 7e: restraint of growth of Soviet influence
versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to China.):

The analysis of the fifth EEI is generally applicable here.

The EEI is so broad that a satisfactory comment on each of the factors of the cost-benefit, and cost-effectiveness analyses would be descriptive rather than analytical, because the problem can be attacked in so many ways. On that basis, it can be assumed that a primary application of controlled Humint would be useful against this EEI. This more nearly resembles a statement of interest than an EEI, although it conforms with the boundaries of the T/O area.

EEI: "What are Soviet intentions toward Western Europe;

how would they be affected by alternative courses of action?"

(Source: T/O area 7f: Restraint of growth of Soviet influence
versus Soviet strategic requirements in regard to Europe).

This EEI suffers from the same problems as the fifth EEI and the immediately previous one: It is far too broad in scope to be analyzed by this method; a situation aggravated by the fact that alternative circumstances are included. The target analysis of this kind of EEI would require a separate paper.

EEI: "When, where, and in what manner does India intend to exploit her dominance over smaller powers in South Asia and the Indian Ocean littoral?" (Source: T/O 1a: Prevention of dominance versus regional hegemony.)

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: As was the case with the Soviet Union when high-level political intentions were the subject of the informational objective, the target group is necessarily very small. A major difference, of course, is that India, as a nation, is not a closed society, although its top leadership group can be assumed to be as insulated from the hoi polloi as would a comparable group in any country. The differences between the political systems of India and Russia are apt to be greater than the differences between the security afforded their leaders. Nevertheless, the target--the political elites, preferably in office--while small, may be somewhat more accessible than a comparable group in the Soviet Union.

Time: The relative openness of Indian society favors timely accomplishment of this mission; past ill-feeling toward America may hinder it. While the requirement is urgent, India is still in the process of analyzing her new power position and will be some time in coming to grips with her nuclear status. For these reasons, there is a good chance of establishing a reporting capability before it is most needed.

Risk: The risk is high, but probably not dangerous to United States national security. At most, a scandalous discovery of this operation could tend to confirm the worst suspicions of many Indians regarding United States intentions, and drive many relevant groups toward the Soviet Union in their sympathies.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: Some capability, after intention has resolved into policy and decision, particularly against the "where" and "in what manner" components of the EEI.

Sigint: Same capability as Photint and somewhat more timely.

Exploitative Humint: Fairly good capability, due mainly to the freedom of the press and of travel, and to the national debate in India which is and will continue to be addressed to this policy question.

Conclusion: A great deal can be gained by an integrated, balanced attack on the problem. Controlled Humint enjoys its greatest relative advantage in monitoring the crystallization of intentions. It has a relatively smaller contribution to make than it would against a similar target in the Soviet Union, due to the difference between the societies of the two countries.

EEI: "Would India accept a United States offer to guarantee her safety from nuclear attack by China, in place of the Soviet 'umbrella'?" (Source: T/O 3b: Alliances versus great power relations.)

Cost-benefit analysis

Target: The analysis of the preceding EEI applies.

Time: By its nature and due to the recent detonation of a nuclear device by India, it is possible that this EEI could be overtaken by events, if India is able to acquire in a few years a nuclear capability which she considers adequate for her purposes. On the assumption, however, that no country in such a position would consider herself to have more than enough security, it is more likely that the question will remain open. That being the case, the defenses surrounding the answers to the EEI will be as strong as they would anywhere, when the subject is of such high diplomatic, political, and military importance. It is necessary to assume that such a reporting capability could not be established until we are well into the midrange period.

Risk: The risk is very high because of the relationship to vital Indian security matters, and the involvement with the Soviet Union. The operation could, in fact, be self-defeating, if its discovery created internal political pressures to favor the Soviet Union.

Cost-effectiveness analysis

Photint: Not applicable.

Sigint: Marginally applicable, and not very timely.

Exploitative Humint: Good capability against the general political climate, although not necessarily against trends within the leadership.

Conclusion: While controlled Humint represents the only (theoretical) capability against the private or mental deliberations of the top Indian leadership, the high risk and problematical time factor tend to reduce the value of this technique. It might be wiser to rely on exploitative Humint and the diplomatic community.

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